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1. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
“The soaring pay of top executives has caused a public outcry […] and rumblings 
of discontent […]. The real problem is not the level of salaries, but their failure to 
reflect performance.”1 
 
Executive compensation is often rumored to be unrelated to firm performance or to 
be connected with short-term rather than long-term profitability. 
Overshadowed by the recent economic crisis, business companies face the 
challenge of implementing effective incentives for their executives that have a 
positive impact on firm performance. Not even multi-million bonus payments could 
protect numerous enterprises from insolvency. 
 
Inferior firm performance can be based on incompetence of managers, insufficient 
incentives for managers, or both. Antidotes include replacing incumbents with more 
skilled managers, establishing the right incentives, or a combination of the two. In the 
contemporary literature, these amendments are often considered as complementary. 
If managers are incompetent in the first place, little can be gained from establishing 
the right incentives. Similarly, competent managers slack off under inadequately 
structured incentives.2 
1.1 INCENTIVES AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION 
“Incentive: from Latin incentivum, noun use from neuter of incentivus („setting the 
tune‟), from stem of incinere („to strike up‟), from in („in, into‟) + canere („to sing‟); 
antonym: disincentive3.”4 
 
An incentive is any factor that motivates a particular course of action, or is regarded 
as a reason for preferring one choice to the alternatives.5 
                                            
1 The Economist, Vol. 335 (1995), (qtd. in: Conyon, Nicolitsas (1998)) 
2 See Muravyev (2003) 
3 In this thesis, I refer to negative incentives or disincentives as turnover, meaning 
dismissal. 
4 URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incentive [June 16, 2010] 
5 URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incentive#cite_note-0 [June 16, 2010] 
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Usually, incentives serve several purposes:6 
o Motivation: encouraging the willingness to perform, 
o Control: aligning executive aims to corporate objectives, 
o Information: signaling what kind of performance is (not) rewarded, 
o Cooperation: encouraging cooperation with other company divisions, 
o Alteration: pointing out modified requirements (variation in strategy), and 
o Screening: selecting a certain type7 of executive 
 
Aligning executive aims to corporate objectives includes inhibiting managerial 
discretion. 
The managerial-discretion literature preceded the development of principal-agent 
models8 and addressed the question what goals managers pursue instead of profit 
maximization. Managerial goals include:9 
o leisure, 
o sales, 
o staff and emoluments, as well as 
o growth10, which results in pecuniary11 and non-pecuniary12 benefits. 
 
Constraints on managerial discretion include:13 
o the capital market, as it eliminates the principal-agent problem under the 
rational expectations assumption, 
o competitive product and factor markets, as in a rigid competitive environment, it 
will be impracticable for managers to do anything other than maximizing their 
firm‟s profit if they wish to survive, 
                                            
6 See Becker, Kramarsch (2006), 11f 
7 E.g. risk-seeking vs. risk-averse 
8 See 2.1 
9 See Mueller (2003), 68ff 
10 Growth can be realized by paying too little in dividends, and retaining and investing too 
much. 
11 Promotion and an increase in the number of hierarchy levels lead to higher salary. 
12 Power, prestige, etc. 
13 See Mueller (2003), 82ff 
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o the market for managers, as hard work and little on-the-job-consumption 
increase the chance of being promoted, 
o the market for corporate control14, and 
o contractual constraints15. 
Incentives are an example of contractual constraints. This leads to the research issue 
of the present thesis. 
1.2 RESEARCH ISSUE AND MODUS OPERANDI 
By means of a meta-analysis of sixty studies, the thesis investigates the efficiency of 
the two major incentive systems positive vs. negative incentives, i.e. bonus vs. 
dismissal. Its aim is to identify the more useful framework from an economic point of 
view and bring to light which one leads to better firm performance. This thesis omits 
notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and culture. 
 
“Managers, like many other wage earners, face basically three different incentives: 
pay for performance, promotion opportunities, and the threat of being replaced.”16 
 
The meta-analysis specifically discusses pay for performance and the threat of being 
replaced, but it excludes promotion opportunities. 
In addition, the analysis intends to identify the relevant factors17 affecting the 
implementation of a particular incentive scheme. The studies are clustered in 
industries, countries, continents, regions, and time periods to evaluate possible 
correlations regarding the incentive type, its effect on firm performance, and how 
company performance is measured. 
 
The next part of the thesis intends to give an overview of the theoretical framework 
the subject of incentives is based on. 
                                            
14 E.g. hostile takeovers 
15 E.g. the principal-agent contract, see 2.1 
16 Eriksson (2005) 
17 Industry, country, continent/region, or time period 
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Motivation and incentives, including possible types of incentives and their relation to 
shareholder wealth, are discussed after a brief introduction to the principal-agent 
theory and the managerial power approach in the third chapter of the thesis. 
The fourth section covers empirical evidence on incentives for executives focusing on 
different countries and industries, including evidence on the relation between 
incentives and firm performance. 
The last part of the thesis contains the meta-analysis with descriptive statistics, a 
correlation analysis and a logistic regression. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter simply intends to provide a general idea of the principal-agent and 
managerial power frameworks to facilitate the understanding of the thesis. 
Economic models of compensation generally suppose that higher performance is 
associated with disutility on the part of the worker. These models assume reward 
systems so that a worker‟s expected utility increases with his productivity.18 
2.1 PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
Executive compensation is often referred to as a real-world example of a principal-
agent problem.19 
The principal-agent problem has its source in the separation between ownership and 
control of an organization. The underlying dilemma in principal-agent situations is 
how to align the concerns of the principal20 with those of the agent21.22 
 
Agency costs originate from this divergence in interests between the principal and 
the agent.23 
Agency costs comprise: 
o the monitoring costs of principals, 
o the bonding costs of agents, and 
o dead-weight losses. 
 
The principal-agent literature suggests a contractual solution to this predicament. The 
principals do not have adequate information to insure that the agent maximizes their 
wealth. The effort exerted is the private information of the agent. On this account, the 
                                            
18 See Baker et al. (1988) 
19 See Weisbach (2007) 
20 The shareholder 
21 The manager 
22 See Mueller (2003), 64f 
23 See Main (1991) 
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principals devise an employment contract that encourages the agent to maximize the 
principals‟ wealth.24 
 
There are three implicit assumptions which are the foundations of the basic principal-
agent model:25 
o The agent is averse to effort and will choose as low a level of effort as he can 
and still get paid. 
o The agent is averse to risk. 
o The factions cannot contract on the level of effort. 
 
In a principal-agent problem, remuneration is fixed at the manager‟s reservation 
utility. To solve the underlying agency problem, incentives are provided for the 
executives.26 
 
The principal-agent theory regards executive compensation primarily as a solution for 
the agency problem. According to Bebchuk and Fried, a noteworthy quandary of this 
real-world example is the fact that not the principals, i.e. the shareholders, but rather 
the managers themselves design the managers‟ employment contracts in the real 
world.27 
2.2 MANAGERIAL POWER APPROACH 
The managerial power approach is an alternative view to the principal-agent theory 
and has been developed by Bebchuk and Fried. 
Bebchuk and Fried distinguish managerial power from any bargaining power 
executives might have vis-à-vis the company because of their individual talents and 
features. Managerial power goes beyond bargaining power and means the control an 
executive has over the board of directors. It allows the executive to gain more utility 
in a negotiation given whatever bargaining power he holds. Utility in this case means 
                                            
24 See Mueller (2003), 84 
25 See Baron, Kreps (1999), 248 
26 See Weisbach (2007) 
27 See Bebchuk, Fried (2004), 61 
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the executive can set a considerable part of his own compensation resulting in higher 
pay or pay that is less sensitive to performance.28 
An executive‟s managerial power depends on the company‟s ownership and 
governance structure and therefore comes in many different shapes.29 
 
“Other things being equal, managers will tend to have more power when 
o the board is relatively weak or ineffectual, 
o there is no large outside shareholder, 
o there are fewer institutional shareholders, and 
o managers are protected by antitakeover arrangements.”30 
 
As opposed to the principal-agent theory, the managerial power approach considers 
the pay-setting process itself as a key part of the agency problem. It implies that not 
even chief executive officer (CEO) compensation agreements including incentive 
plans exclusively take account of shareholders‟ interests.31 
Options and restricted shares are not seen as a method to provide incentives for 
executives but are merely another way to hand over money.32 
 
The only boundary to executive compensation under the managerial power approach 
is represented by the so-called „outrage costs‟33. Outrage costs emerge when the 
public considers executive compensation to be disproportionately high. The 
subsequent public reaction to the company allegorizes the costs to the executive. 
Unlike principal-agent theory, the managerial power approach sets executive pay as 
high as possible limited only by public perceptions.34 
                                            
28 See Bebchuk, Fried (2004), 62 
29 See Bebchuk, Fried (2004), 64 
30 Bebchuk, Fried (2004), 80 
31 See Bebchuk, Fried (2004), 61f 
32 See Weisbach (2007) 
33 See Bebchuk, Fried (2004), 64 
34 See Weisbach (2007) 
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3. MOTIVATION AND INCENTIVES 
This section presents possible types of incentives and their relation to shareholder 
wealth. It covers: 
o intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, 
o relative performance evaluation, 
o executive compensation, 
o deferred remuneration, 
o rank-order tournaments, 
o promotion, and 
o dismissal. 
Further issues comprise 
o the question whether incentives are based on accounting profits or stock market 
returns, and 
o the relation between shareholder value and executive compensation. 
3.1 INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
The incentive-contribution-theory is a theory of work motivation. The basic idea of 
this theory implies that human beings optimize their effort to obtain an equilibrium 
between their contribution and the incentives they receive.35 
 
Intrinsic motivation is rooted in task fulfillment itself, e.g. in enjoying the chore, in 
moral concepts, or in personal goals.36 
On the other hand, extrinsic motivation has its source in environmental 
circumstances, e.g. monetary incentives, competition, or punishment.37 
Interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation includes the “crowding-out-
effect”. The motivation crowding theory suggests that extrinsic motivation may 
undermine intrinsic motivation.38 
                                            
35 See Havranek, Mauhart (2010), 10 
36 See Mayrhofer (2009) 
37 See Mayrhofer (2009) 
38 See Mayrhofer (2009) 
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3.2 RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
To provide incentives that reflect performance, company and manager performance 
have to be evaluated. 
Relative performance evaluation entails comparing a firm‟s performance with the 
performance of companies in the same industry or market. However, relative 
performance evaluation is more functional in competitive environments because 
CEOs have more peers and are more likely to be subject to comparable 
uncertainties. Empirical analyses corroborate that greater simplicity in detecting 
substandard managers should lead to higher turnover rates in more homogeneous 
industries.39 
 
Performance evaluation fulfills several purposes, e.g.:40 
o improving job matching, 
o communicating organizational values and objectives, 
o information for self-improvement, 
o pay and promotion for performance, 
o evaluating human resource practices, or 
o legal defense. 
 
The advantage of relative performance evaluation is straightforward: the risk 
exposure of risk-averse managers can be decreased by filtering out some or all of 
the common risk.41 
Costs of relative performance evaluation include observing the average performance 
of organizations that are subject to the same common shock.42 
                                            
39 See Muravyev (2003) 
40 See Baron, Kreps (1999), 211f 
41 See Gibbons, Murphy (1990) 
42 See Gibbons, Murphy (1990) 
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3.3 COMPENSATION AS AN INCENTIVE FOR EXECUTIVES 
Executive compensation is composed of fixed and variable elements. 
Fixed compensation consists of base salary and fringe benefits43. Variable 
remuneration elements contain short-term bonuses and long-term incentive plans44. 
Short-term incentive compensation rewards the achievement of short-term aims 
depicted by performance figures whereas long-term incentive elements recompense 
the realization of major business objectives.45 
 
A cost-effective method to achieve the executive‟s obedience is a deal whereby he is 
paid exclusively in the form of corporate equity. Such a dodge would leave the 
executive extremely exposed to the company‟s serendipity which may be disturbed 
by incidents beyond the manager‟s control. Therefore, some compromise is 
necessary.46 
 
The sort of compensation that is best for one firm may not be best for another. Ryan 
and Wiggins look at attributes of firms and their managers and scrutinize the relations 
between the different types of incentive compensation which include cash bonuses, 
restricted stock and stock options.47 
 
Firm-specific characteristics include:48 
o firm size, 
o ownership structure, 
o capital structure, 
o cash flow volatility, 
o investment opportunities, 
o monitoring mechanisms, 
o CEO stock ownership, and 
                                            
43 Non-wage payment or benefit, e.g. company car, insurance programs, or pension plans 
44 Profit participation, stock-based compensation, e.g. stock (“performance shares”) and 
stock option plans, as well as operating-based remuneration, e.g. long-term cash rewards 
45 See Becker, Kramarsch (2006), 36f 
46 See Main (1991) 
47 See Ryan, Wiggins (2001) 
48 See Ryan, Wiggins (2001) 
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o CEO/board chair duality. 
 
Managerial attributes comprise:49 
o the CEO‟s age and 
o tenure. 
 
Firms with high growth opportunities receive a lot of their value from future 
investments. Since these assets are not yet in place, monitoring is a difficult method 
for controlling agency problems. Agency theory suggests that growth firms should 
offer equity-based incentives in order to moderate these monitoring problems. Ryan 
and Wiggins document a positive relation between the use of stock options and the 
firm‟s investment opportunity.50 
A different agency conflict surfaces when a risk-averse manager bears residual risk 
and responds by foregoing risky investment projects. In this case, the optimal 
incentive contract should restrict the risk borne by the manager.51 
 
A common form of agency conflict occurs when the manager‟s horizon is shorter than 
the firm‟s horizon. A manager might have a short horizon when he is approaching 
retirement or when he aspires building his reputation to improve his value in the labor 
market. Given his short horizon, the manager will focus on projects that will pay off 
while he is still in office. Ryan and Wiggins use the CEO‟s age to proxy for the 
horizon problem and suggest that horizon conflicts are to be expected mostly for the 
oldest and the youngest CEOs. The authors recommend that the oldest and the 
youngest managers should be offered a compensation package that contains more 
equity-based pay and less cash bonus.52 
 
                                            
49 See Ryan, Wiggins (2001) 
50 See Ryan, Wiggins (2001) 
51 See Ryan, Wiggins (2001) 
52 Cf. Ryan, Wiggins (2001); Mueller (2003), 83 
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Deckop examines determinants of executive compensation with particular emphasis 
on measures of firm performance. Since CEO compensation is based on other 
factors as well, Deckop‟s model investigates some major hypotheses. It includes:53 
o firm performance variables like profit, sales, and market equity value, 
o market factors, which are represented by the external labor market and the way 
a person becomes CEO, 
o individual attributes of job incumbents, e.g. general business experience 
represented by age, and tenure as a CEO, as well as 
o the Consumer Price Index to control for price changes over time. 
 
Deckop finds that CEOs are not incentivized to escalate the size of the firm at the 
expense of profit but rather receive compensation that is positively related to profit as 
a percentage of sales. That finding is entirely consistent with the fact that CEOs in 
large firms generally earn more than CEOs in small firms. Then, the author states 
that CEOs recruited from outside the firm earn significantly more than internally 
promoted CEOs. CEOs who were founders of the firm are discovered to be paid 
much less than internally promoted CEOs. The market equity value and the CEO‟s 
age and tenure, however, have an insignificant impact on compensation.54 
3.4 DEFERRED REMUNERATION 
“Deferred executive compensation is any arrangement providing payment to an 
executive in a year or years subsequent to the year in which profit is earned.”55 
 
Deferred remuneration is a long-term incentive policy which benefits the firm‟s long-
term performance.56 
Ju studies the application of the principal-agent model by Chinese state-owned 
enterprises and analyzes the outcome of deferred executive remuneration policies in 
China. The author compiles a model of a deferred executive compensation policy in 
                                            
53 See Deckop (1988) 
54 See Deckop (1988) 
55 Ju (2007) 
56 See Ju (2007) 
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which the executives‟ compensation depends on the firms‟ future revenue. The 
model explains the effectiveness of deferred compensation policies as it shows that 
managers offer an increasing level of effort in every period. Furthermore, Ju finds 
that managers tend to invest in profitable long-term investments, which might 
generate revenue even after the termination of managerial contracts.57 
3.5 RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS 
Lazear and Rosen investigate compensation systems which pay according to an 
executive‟s ordinal rank rather than his output level. They put forward the hypothesis 
that executive compensation may not epitomize individual productivity but may rather 
represent the result of a competitive process among managers. The tournament can 
be thought of as being self-funding. All contestants implicitly deposit part of their 
expected marginal product into a pot. The winner collects a „prize‟ drawn from the pot 
and the runners-up obtain less than their expected marginal product. The authors 
show that under particular conditions a remuneration scheme that features a 
tournament character can induce the optimal investment of effort by participants.58 
3.6 PROMOTION AS AN INCENTIVE 
Wage levels in a hierarchical organization are often tied to job levels in the firm and 
not to individuals. Individuals differ in their skills and abilities, and jobs differ in the 
requirements they impose on individuals.59 
 
Promotion fulfills two different functions:60 
o It is a method to match individuals to the jobs to which they are appropriate. 
o Promotion provides incentives for lower level employees who desire the pay 
and prestige associated with a higher rank in the organization. 
                                            
57 See Ju (2007) 
58 See Lazear, Rosen (1981) 
59 See Baker et al. (1988) 
60 See Baker et al. (1988) 
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3.7 DISMISSAL AS AN INCENTIVE 
The dismissal of top executives is one of the most important instruments of corporate 
governance. Linking turnover to firm performance can provide a strong incentive for 
performance.61 
 
The economic literature identifies several factors that affect forced resignation of 
CEOs. The main causes are:62 
o CEO performance and 
o the ability of monitors to assess it accurately, 
o the market for corporate control, 
o the firm‟s ownership structure and 
o board size as well as 
o board composition, 
o the firm‟s debt constraints, 
o incumbent CEO age and 
o tenure, 
o availability of a capable successor and 
o costs of hiring and firing managers. 
 
Meager performance of managers is viewed as the main reason triggering their 
substitution. Most empirical studies from developed countries illustrate that the 
probability of managerial turnover is inversely related to firm performance which is 
considered as a proxy for managerial effort.63 
The exclusive surveying of firm performance is unlikely to suffice in assessing CEO 
performance accurately as there is a variety of aspects beyond managerial control 
like a general economic recession or an industry shock.64 
 
                                            
61 See Kim (1996) 
62 See Muravyev (2003) 
63 See Muravyev (2003) 
64 See Muravyev (2003) 
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Economic literature demonstrates that there is a link between corporate control 
activities and managerial turnover. Empirical studies describe an increase in 
management turnover after successful takeovers. However, corporate control 
activities like mergers and tender offers do not inevitably emanate from poor 
company performance.65 
3.8 ARE INCENTIVES BASED ON ACCOUNTING OR STOCK 
MARKET RETURNS? 
Boschen et al. study the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO 
compensation from 1959 to 1995. They find that unexpectedly good accounting 
performance at first correlates with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect 
reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. This adds up to an 
insignificant long-run cumulative financial gain. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock 
price performance yields increases in CEO pay in the long-run.66 
3.9 SHAREHOLDER VALUE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
Shareholders who wish to constrain managers from pursuing their own goals will tie 
managerial compensation to shareholder wealth.67 
There are a lot of mechanisms through which compensation policy can provide 
shareholder value-increasing incentives:68 
o performance-based bonuses, 
o salary revisions, 
o stock options, and 
o performance-based dismissal decisions. 
 
CEO compensation is directly related to shareholder wealth through shareholdings 
and share options. In addition, CEO pay can be indirectly linked to shareholder 
                                            
65 See Muravyev (2003) 
66 See Boschen et al. (2003) 
67 See Mueller (2003), 88 
68 See Jensen, Murphy (1990) 
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wealth by means of accounting-based bonuses and through year-to-year 
adjustments in salary levels. Furthermore, CEO wealth is affected by performance 
since CEOs lose their jobs when their firms are performing poorly.69 
 
Jensen and Murphy estimate the magnitude of the incentives provided by each of 
these mechanisms. They find that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 
change in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership 
are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of 
their firm‟s stock. Managerial compensation contracts in the United States are almost 
pure insurance contracts that provide not enough monetary incentives for managers 
to increase shareholder wealth. The authors hypothesize that public and private 
political forces impose constraints that reduce the pay-performance sensitivity. 
Declines in both the pay-performance relation and the level of CEO pay since the 
1930s are consistent with this hypothesis.70 
The authors‟ estimates suggest that dismissals are not a significant source of 
managerial incentives since the increase in dismissal probability due to poor 
performance and the penalties associated with dismissal are both small.71 
The meta-analysis in the present thesis, however, arrives at a different conclusion. 
                                            
69 See Conyon, Murphy (2000) 
70 See Jensen, Murphy (1990) 
71 See Jensen, Murphy (1990) 
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4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF INCENTIVES FOR 
EXECUTIVES 
This section summarizes the empirical findings of various studies about incentives for 
executives focusing on different countries and industries. It does not address the 
issue of the countries‟ different corporate governance systems. 
Furthermore, the present section gives a resume of empirical evidence on the 
relation between managerial incentives, particularly dismissal, and firm performance. 
4.1 AMERICA 
4.1.1 Canada 
Zhou observes executive compensation in Canadian firms over the period 1991-
1995. The findings are consistent with previous studies insofar as CEO pay 
increases with firm size and compensation is attached to company performance. 
While the probability of CEO turnover is generally negatively related to the firm‟s 
stock performance, the threat of dismissal seems to be less distinct in small firms.72 
4.1.2 US 
Lewellen et al. analyze senior executive compensation in large industrial US firms 
from 1964 to 1973. They find that there is a relationship between remuneration and 
firm performance and that companies that pay better perform better.73 
 
Kaplan compares top executive turnover and compensation, and their relation to firm 
performance in the largest Japanese and US companies in the 1980s. The corporate 
governance system in Japan is generally said to differ significantly from the US 
system. The Japanese system is described as bank and relationship oriented and the 
US system as (stock) market oriented.74 
                                            
72 See Zhou (2000) 
73 See Lewellen et al. (1992) 
74 See Kaplan (1994a) 
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The author finds some evidence that the fortunes of Japanese executives are more 
sensitive to low operating income but less sensitive to stock returns than those of 
their US counterparts.75 
4.2 ASIA 
4.2.1 China 
Li and Zhou investigate the turnover of Chinese provincial leaders between 1979 and 
1995. They find that the probability of promotion of provincial leaders rises with their 
economic performance, while the likelihood of termination declines with their 
economic performance. They also find that the turnover of provincial leaders is more 
sensitive to their average performance over their tenure than to their annual 
performance.76 
 
Firth et al. study the relation between CEO compensation and firm performance in 
Chinese listed firms which have a dominant or controlling shareholder from 1998 to 
2000. The authors suggest that the individual types of controlling shareholders have 
disparate effects on the employment of incentive remuneration. One peculiar 
difference between listed firms in China and those in other countries is the existence 
of a dominant shareholder who has a say in the firm‟s control.77 
The authors find that firms that have a state agency as the major shareholder do not 
have a tendency to use performance related pay. In contrast, firms that have private 
blockholders as the major shareholders are likely to relate managerial remuneration 
to firm performance. Still, the pay-performance sensitivities for CEOs are low and this 
challenges the effectiveness of firms‟ incentive systems.78 
4.2.2 Japan 
Abe studies CEO turnover and its relationship to firm performance in Japan from 
1974 to 1990. The author finds that the long-run performance measurements of 
                                            
75 See Kaplan (1994a) 
76 See Li, Zhou (2005) 
77 See Firth et al. (2006) 
78 See Firth et al. (2006) 
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individual CEOs are significantly related to turnover. The turnover probability tends to 
be low at the early stage of a CEO‟s tenure and increases in the intermediate tenure 
durations. Moreover, the effect of firm performance on turnover probability is small.79 
 
Ang and Constand find from 1980 to 1992 that only a relatively small fraction of 
Japanese executives receives increased compensation from short-term share value 
rises. On the other hand, there is some indication of the existence of incentives to 
pursue long-term share value increases. Bonuses, however, are found to be more 
related to short-term performance. Furthermore, sales maximization takes a 
dominant role in setting executive compensation agreements.80 
 
From 1985 to 1990, Kang and Shivdasani find that the likelihood of non-routine 
turnover in Japan is significantly related to industry-adjusted return on assets, excess 
stock returns, and negative operating income, but is not related to industry 
performance.81 
4.2.3 Korea 
Kato et al. observe the pay-performance relations of Korean executives from 1998 to 
2001. The authors find that executive compensation is significantly related to stock 
market performance and that the magnitude of the pay-performance sensitivity is 
comparable to that of the US and Japan.82 
4.2.4 The Philippines 
Unite et al. examine the nature of the relation between executive compensation and 
firm performance in the Philippines from 2001 to 2003. The authors find a positive 
relation between executive compensation and firm performance for companies not 
affiliated to a corporate group. This relation does not hold for affiliated firms.83 
                                            
79 See Abe (1997) 
80 See Ang, Constand (1997) 
81 See Kang, Shivdasani (1995) 
82 See Kato et al. (2007) 
83 See Unite et al. (2008) 
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4.3 EASTERN EUROPE 
Jones and Kato study the determinants of CEO compensation in transitional 
economies from 1989 to 1993. Using standard specifications similar to those used in 
studies of managerial compensation in Western countries, they find that CEO pay is 
positively related to size84, but not to profitability85. In specifications adapted to 
transitional economies, CEO compensation is found to be positively related to size 
and productivity. The results show that productivity is an important determinant of 
CEO compensation in transitional economies. The relation between CEO pay and 
productivity is stronger in firms that are either privatized or corporatized than in firms 
that remain entirely state-owned and controlled.86 
The strong pay-size correlations, combined with the absence of pay-profitability 
relationships, imply that at the beginning of the 1990s, executive compensation in 
transitional economies was still largely structured so as to provide incentives for 
managers to increase size and to take no notice of profitability. Alternatively, the 
similarly strong pay-productivity rapport shows the existence of incentives to augment 
productivity.87 
4.3.1 Czech Republic 
In the former socialist economies, state-owned enterprises practiced a choice of non-
commercial objectives in addition to or instead of profit maximization. Privatization 
should restore profit maximization as the leading objective of firm activities. The 
efficiency improvements established by the new post-privatization owners can evolve 
either from incentives encouraging profit maximization or through appointment of new 
and better managers.88 
Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc compare the impact of these two types of efficiency-improving 
modifications on firm performance after privatization in the Czech Republic from 1993 
to 1998.89 
                                            
84 Measured by employment and sales 
85 Measured by return on assets and the profit margin 
86 See Jones, Kato (1996) 
87 See Jones, Kato (1996) 
88 See Fidrmuc, Fidrmuc (2007) 
89 See Fidrmuc, Fidrmuc (2007) 
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The authors find weak evidence for the existence of managerial incentives. However, 
substituting the managing director in a newly privatized firm enhances subsequent 
performance. Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc discover that institutional framework is relevant 
and that managerial turnover increases firm performance only if the management is 
closely interrelated with the board of directors and in consequence holds effective 
executive authority.90 
 
Claessens and Djankov study the effect of management turnover on changes in 
enterprise performance in the Czech Republic from 1993 to 1997. They find that the 
appointment of new managers is associated with improvements in profit margins and 
labor productivity. Equity holdings of general managers have a small positive effect 
on corporate performance.91 
4.3.2 Russia 
Muravyev reviews determinants of CEO turnover in Russian privatized firms from 
1998 to 2000. He finds that inferior past company performance92 increases the 
chance of CEO replacement. The turnover of senior managers in Russian privatized 
firms is generally guided by the same forces as in developed economies. Managers 
of enterprises that underperform compared to other companies in their industry deal 
with a higher probability of replacement.93 
4.3.3 Ukraine 
Muravyev et al. study executive turnover in the Ukraine from 2002 to 2006. They find 
a statistically significant negative association between the past firm performance and 
the likelihood of managerial turnover.94 
                                            
90 See Fidrmuc, Fidrmuc (2007) 
91 See Claessens, Djankov (1999) 
92 Measured by labor productivity 
93 See Muravyev (2003) 
94 See Muravyev et al. (2009) 
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4.4 WESTERN EUROPE 
4.4.1 Denmark 
Lausten examines the relationship between the replacement of CEOs and corporate 
performance in Danish firms from 1992 to 1995 and tests the hypothesis that CEO 
turnover is inversely related to firm performance. The results are consistent with the 
principal-agent theory.95 
Although corporate governance in Denmark is claimed to be different from corporate 
governance in Japan and the US, the author discovers qualitatively similar outcomes 
on the CEO turnover-performance relation. The Danish corporate governance 
system is organized by a two-tier board system. It consists of a supervisory board as 
the legislative authority and a board of managers as the executive authority. 
Management is a mutual concern of the supervisory and the management boards – 
both are formally responsible.96 
 
Eriksson et al. find that the turnover risk of Danish CEOs increases with lower rates 
of solvency but is unaffected by profitability changes.97 
4.4.2 Finland 
Maury investigates how firm performance affects top executive turnover in Finnish 
listed companies from 1993 to 2000. He finds that CEO turnover increases in 
response to poor stock price performance and operating losses.98 
4.4.3 Norway 
Firth et al. explore the determinants of Norwegian chief executive compensation from 
1986 to 1994. They find a positive relationship between CEO pay and corporate size 
but there is no significant association between compensation and corporate financial 
performance.99 
                                            
95 See Lausten (2002) 
96 See Lausten (2002) 
97 See Eriksson et al. (2001) 
98 See Maury (2006) 
99 See Firth et al. (1996) 
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4.4.4 Germany 
Kaplan studies executive turnover and its relation to firm performance in Germany 
from 1981 to 1989. He finds that turnover increases significantly with poor stock 
performance and poor earnings, but is unrelated to sales decline.100 
4.4.5 Italy 
Brunello et al. examine the determinants of CEO pay in a sample of Italian firms from 
1993 to 1996. The authors find evidence that supports their hypothesis postulating 
that the characteristics of the Italian capital market and corporate governance, as 
well as the specific relationship between banks and firms imply a low fraction of 
incentive pay over total compensation and a low sensitivity of incentive pay to firm 
performance.101 
4.4.6 UK 
Conyon finds an inverse relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance 
from 1986 to 1994 in the UK.102 
 
Conyon and Nicolitsas study executive compensation and tenure from 1985 to 1992 
in the UK. They find that CEO pay and tenure in small companies is sensitive to 
sales growth.103 
 
Cosh examines the structure of executive remuneration from 1969 to 1971 in the UK. 
He finds that company size is the major determinant of CEO compensation.104 
4.5 INCENTIVES OVER TIME 
Hadlock and Lumer find that the rate of top management turnover and the sensitivity 
of turnover to stock returns were significantly smaller for a sample of large industrial 
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firms in the US from 1933 to 1941 than estimates reported for modern panels. They 
demonstrate that managerial compensation has become more sensitive to firm 
performance since the 1930s.105 
4.6 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
Principal-agent approaches perceive executive compensation as a reward for 
managerial expertise and as an instrument to accomplish only those M&A 
agreements that contribute to shareholder value creation. Managerial power 
approaches on the contrary see mergers as the product of personal objectives such 
as empire building. Extant literature indicates a strong positive correlation between 
firm size and executive pay.106 
 
Coakley and Iliopoulou investigate the impact of mergers and acquisitions on bidder 
executive compensation in the UK and the US from 1998 to 2001. They find that 
subsequent to the completion of a merger, less independent and larger boards grant 
their CEOs significantly higher bonuses and salaries versus their more independent 
and smaller counterparts. In general, their findings corroborate the managerial power 
rather than the principal-agent theory.107 
4.7 NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
Non-profit establishments primarily represent organizations in health care, education, 
social services, and the arts. In spite of playing such an important role, little is known 
about methods of incentivizing managers in non-profit organizations.108 
The lack of ownership rules out stock-based compensation as well as the external 
market for corporate control. In addition, given the organizations‟ hard-to-observe 
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108 See Brickley, Van Horn (2002) 
Empirical Evidence of Incentives for Executives  
25 
outputs, evaluating managerial performance and composing expedient incentive 
contracts is tricky.109 
Brickley and Van Horn look at the incentives of CEOs in a large sample of non-profit 
hospitals from 1991 to 1995. They compare CEO incentives in non-profit hospitals 
with CEO incentives in for-profit hospitals. They find that both turnover and 
compensation of CEOs in non-profit hospitals are significantly related to financial 
performance110. Nevertheless, this relation appears weaker in for-profit hospitals. The 
authors find no evidence that non-profit hospitals provide explicit incentives for their 
CEOs to focus on altruistic activities. The study suggests that managers of non-profit 
organizations encounter incentives to optimize financial performance as well. Threat 
of turnover, however, appears to be stronger in non-profit hospitals than in for-profit 
hospitals.111 
4.8 SUBSIDIARIES OF CONGLOMERATES 
McNeil et al. contrast turnover of subsidiary managers inside conglomerate firms to 
turnover of CEOs of equivalent stand-alone firms from 1987 to 1998. The authors 
find that subsidiary manager turnover is significantly more sensitive to changes in 
performance and significantly more likely following poor performance. For subsidiary 
managers, the relation between turnover and performance is significantly stronger 
when the subsidiary operates in an industry that is related to the parent‟s primary 
industry.112 
4.9 FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED FIRMS 
Gilson and Vetsuypens study senior management compensation in publicly traded 
firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt from 1981 to 1987. 
Overall, firms systematically restructure their management compensation contracts 
when they experience grave financial difficulty. Almost one third of all CEOs are 
replaced, and those who keep their jobs often face substantial salary and bonus cuts. 
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Newly appointed CEOs from inside the firm are paid 35% less than the CEOs they 
replace. In striking contrast, new CEOs from outside the firm are paid 36% more than 
their predecessors, and often receive large grants of stock options as part of their 
compensation.113 
4.10 FUND MANAGERS 
Kapur and Timmermann scrutinize the effects of performance-based contracts for 
fund managers. Their payment is attached to a fund‟s absolute and relative 
performance. This type of performance-based remuneration emerged in the 1990s 
when the stock markets performed fairly well. A fund‟s absolute performance hence 
did not suffice to evaluate the fund manager‟s ability. A contract based on relative 
performance evaluation encourages the manager to outperform the market while 
simultaneously defusing the fund‟s uncertainty.114 
 
In their two-period model, Kapur and Timmermann let the investor allocate his capital 
across two assets: riskless bonds and risky equity shares. He can invest directly in 
these assets or assign the portfolio selection to a professional fund manager. The 
latter alternative evidently is attended by fees but then comes with the fund 
manager‟s access to better information about the relative payoff of the two assets. 
Delegating the portfolio choice to a fund manager, the investor designs the optimal 
performance-based fee arrangement which is hypothesized to be a linear function of 
absolute and relative performance comprising a fixed element that is independent of 
performance. The investor as well as the fund manager are assumed to be risk 
averse. The fee arrangement or delegation contract is subject to a participation 
constraint. If the delegating investor can set the parameters of the linear contract 
optimally, relative performance evaluation serves a limited purpose since it does not 
necessarily outstrip contracts built upon absolute performance alone.115 
Furthermore, delegated portfolios are predisposed to contain more risky assets than 
direct investment portfolios. All the same, the fund manager‟s better information 
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decreases the risky asset‟s risk. This results in greater willingness to hold risky 
assets and reduces the required equilibrium risk premium.116 
4.11 TEACHERS 
Using US data, Figlio and Kenny examine the relationship between individual teacher 
performance incentives and student achievements in 2000. They discover that test 
scores are higher in schools that offer individual financial incentives to teachers. This 
relationship might exist as a result of teachers exerting more effort due to incentives 
or because of better schools adopting teacher incentives. The authors cannot discern 
whether the relationship is due to the incentives themselves or due to better schools 
implementing them.117 
 
Lavy provides evidence on the causal effect of a program that introduced118 
monetary incentives to schools and teachers in Israel in 1996 and 1997. The 
program had the main elements of a rank-order tournament, whereby only the top 
one-third performers were awarded monetary bonuses. The results suggest that the 
schools‟ performance incentives led to significant gains in all five achievement 
measures of high school graduates, including average test scores and the dropout 
rate from ninth to tenth grade. The program led to an increase in the proportion of 
students, especially among those from a disadvantaged background, who qualified 
for a matriculation certificate.119 
 
Eberts et al. present case study evidence from a merit pay system to reward student 
retention from 1994 to 1999. Their results imply that merit pay increases retention 
and the percentage of students who failed but reduced average daily attendance 
rates and had no effect on grade point averages. The findings suggest that incentive 
systems within complex organizations with multiple tasks and outcomes, team 
production, and numerous stakeholders, may produce results that are unintended 
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and, at times, misdirected – unless they are carefully constructed and 
implemented.120 
4.12 THE RELATION BETWEEN INCENTIVES AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
The present section gives a resume of empirical evidence on the relation between 
managerial incentives, particularly dismissal, and firm performance. 
It includes 
o the effect of firm performance on executive turnover, 
o the impact of executive turnover on firm performance, and 
o the efficiency of managerial pay-for-performance 
4.12.1 The Effect of Firm Performance on Executive Turnover 
Kim studies the dynamics of CEO turnover and its relation with firm performance of 
US firms in the 1980s. The author finds that firm performance has a persistent effect 
on the CEO‟s future turnover, except the performance in the early years of the 
executive‟s tenure. Furthermore, the probability of CEO turnover is significantly lower 
in the beginning and after ten years of an executive‟s tenure.121 
 
Parrino studies dynamics that affect the probabilities of voluntary and forced turnover 
of US firms in the 1970s and 1980s. The new CEOs are tested for being from inside 
the firm, from inside the industry, or from outside the industry. The author finds that in 
homogeneous industries, inadequate CEOs are easier to identify and less costly to 
replace than in heterogeneous industries. The likelihood of forced turnover and intra-
industry appointment increases with industry homogeneity.122 
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4.12.2 The Impact of Executive Turnover on Firm Performance 
Blackwell et al. document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover 
and relate them to the performance of US companies from 1981 to 1992. Compared 
to outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs receive a significantly larger fraction of their 
remuneration from options and new stock grants. These results hold even when 
differentiating between voluntary and forced turnover. There is a positive relation 
between new stock grants and future performance. The authors find a positive 
relation between option grants and future performance for the forced turnover sample 
as well.123 
 
Denis and Denis study whether management turnover leads to improved 
performance of US businesses in the 1980s. They find that forced resignations of top 
managers are heralded by large and significant declines in operating performance 
and followed by large improvements in performance. However, forced resignations 
happen rarely due to normal board monitoring.124 
4.12.3 The Efficiency of Managerial Pay-for-Performance 
Mishra et al. study the connection between CEO pay and firm performance in US 
firms from 1974 to 1988 and question if there is a limit to the impact of increasing 
levels of pay-performance sensitivity on future firm performance. The normative 
agency literature suggests that too much compensation risk induces CEOs to pursue 
lower risk strategies that trim down firm performance.125 
 
The authors formulate two hypotheses:126 
o The relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and future performance 
is positive, but the marginal benefit declines as sensitivity rises. 
o The relation between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and future firm 
performance is weaker in high-risk firms than it is in low-risk firms. 
 
                                            
123 See Blackwell et al. (2007) 
124 See Denis, Denis (1995) 
125 See Mishra et al. (2000) 
126 See Mishra et al. (2000) 
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The statistical analysis‟ results confirm that future firm performance is positively 
linked to CEO pay-performance sensitivity at low sensitivity levels. As the level of 
sensitivity rises, the link weakens and then turns negative. The reasons for the 
declining marginal benefit are CEO risk aversion and practical limits to improving 
performance monitoring.127 
                                            
127 See Mishra et al. (2000) 
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5. META-ANALYSIS 
Because of heterogeneous proceedings regarding currencies employed to depict 
executive compensation and different objectives pursued in the studies, as well as 
numerous forms of performance measures used, I refrain from examining the 
correlations more closely. I rather aim at investigating effects impacting firm 
performance and executive incentives using the Cramer‟s V, phi, and eta correlation 
coefficients. 
Additionally, I generate a logistic regression model to identify factors instigating the 
decision to employ negative or positive incentives. Another logistic regression model 
examines the impact of the two incentive frameworks on firm performance. 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
I study 59 papers covering a period of about 60 years from 1948 to 2006. Most of the 
studies were conducted in the 1990s and the 1980s. 
 
Figure 1: Decade Frequencies 
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 On average, the studies examine 589 businesses over a mean observation period of 
8.5 years. 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of Study Duration 
 
 
There were slightly more studies conducted after the year 1990 than before. 
 
Table 1: Era Frequencies 
Frequency Percent
post 1990 38 55,9
pre 1990 30 44,1
Total 68 100,0
 
Meta-Analysis  
33 
The studies comprise eleven industries, which I cluster in six concentrated 
industries128. The majority of research papers monitors executive compensation 
between 1993 and 1995 in the US but does not select a special industry. The second 
most common industry analyzed is the financial sector. 
 
Table 2: Concentrated Industry Frequencies 
 
 Concentrated Industry Frequency Percent
not specified 50 73,5
charitable/education/health/public 6 8,8
financial 6 8,8
commercial 3 4,4
sports 2 2,9
utility 1 1,5
Total 68 100,0
 
 
 
The research papers cover 20 countries and five continents129: 
 
Figure 3: Country Frequencies 
 
 
 
                                            
128 Charitable/education/health care/public (charitable, hospitals, provincial leaders, schools), 
commercial (manufacturing), financial (banking, insurance), sports (basketball, soccer), 
utility, and not specified 
129 America (Canada, US), Asia (China, Israel, Japan, Korea, Philippines), Eurasia (Russia), 
Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, UK, 
Ukraine), not specified (UK and US, not specified) 
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Figure 4: Continent Frequencies 
 
 
Additionally, I unite the countries in regions130: 
 
Figure 5: Region Frequencies 
 
 
                                            
130 America (Canada, US), Asia (China, Israel, Japan, Korea, Philippines), Eastern Europe 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Russia, Ukraine), Western Europe (Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Norway, UK), not specified (UK and US, not specified) 
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I perceive dissimilarities across continents, industries and decades concerning the 
study duration as well as the number of businesses examined. 
European studies survey a mean of 890 businesses, while on average, Asian 
research papers analyze only 343 companies. 
 
Figure 6: Mean Number of Businesses by Continent 
 
 
The mean number of businesses by region shows a similar picture. 
 
Figure 7: Mean Number of Businesses by Region 
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Studies of the 1990s investigate a mean of 672 businesses, while on average, 
reviews from the 1940s and the 1950s only analyze around 20 organizations. 
 
Figure 8: Mean Number of Businesses by Decade 
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On average, papers that were conducted before the year 1990 merely studied 341 
businesses, whereas more recent surveys examine a mean of 784 businesses. 
 
Figure 9: Mean Number of Businesses by Era 
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On average, studies of utility firms last 25 years, whereas surveys on commercial 
enterprises take a mean of only five years. 
 
Figure 10: Mean Study Duration by Concentrated Industry 
 
 
Predictably, the mean study duration is shorter for the more recent research papers. 
 
Figure 11: Mean Study Duration by Decade 
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I identify five types of positive incentives 
o total pay, 
o salary, 
o fringe benefits, 
o bonus, and 
o long-term incentive pay, 
whereas dismissal is the only kind of disincentive analyzed in this thesis. Only eleven 
studies take long-term incentives into account. 
 
Figure 12: Incentive Frequencies 
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32 papers exclusively study the effect of positive incentives on firm performance, 
while 23 make use of solely negative incentives, and 13 employ both. 
 
Figure 13: Type of Incentive Frequencies 
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At an average, there were 1.9 forms of positive incentives examined per study. 
 
Figure 14: Histogram of Number of Positive Incentives 
 
 
Again, I identify variations across industries regarding the number of positive 
incentives analyzed. 
Research papers of financial companies report a mean of three types of positive 
incentives, whereas studies of sport and utility organizations on average observe no 
positive incentives since studies on these industries analyze the effect of negative 
incentives. 
 
Figure 15: Mean Number of Positive Incentives by Concentrated Industry 
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In addition, I detect differences in the number of positive incentives studied 
depending on the decade131 the research paper was composed in. In reviews 
covering the 1940s, the 1950s, and the 1960s, on average four to five positive 
incentives are considered. In studies comprising the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s, 
and the 2000s, however, merely one to two types of positive incentives are regarded. 
 
Figure 16: Mean Number of Positive Incentives by Decade 
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131 Some studies span several decades. Thus, my analysis includes them in every single 
decade they cover. 
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Corporate performance is rated by numerous different measures. These performance 
measures can be classified depending on the area of performance they specify. I 
cluster the various firm performance measures into four categories: 
o efficiency/profitability ratios132, 
o market ratios133, 
o revenue ratios134, and 
o other ratios135. 
 
Figure 17: Performance Measure Category Frequencies 
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132 Labor productivity, return on assets, return on equity, return on sales 
133 Market value, return on stock, share price, shareholder wealth, Tobin‟s Q 
134 Asset size, earnings before interest and taxes, earnings after interest and taxes, gross 
domestic product, operating income, sales 
135 Employment, program activities (charitable organizations), student achievement, winning 
(sports) 
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Among firm performance measures, return on assets, return on stock, and asset size 
are particularly popular. Considering the four categories, revenue ratios are utilized 
by most studies. Performance measures falling in the category “other ratios” are not 
so prevalent, probably because they practically can be applied only to schools as 
well as charitable and sport organizations. 
 
Figure 18: Performance Measure Frequencies 
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In 60 cases, incentives have a positive effect on firm performance, in 8 cases, I 
cannot detect any effect on firm performance, and there is no occurrence of a 
negative effect on firm performance. 
 
Table 3: Effect Frequencies 
 Effect Frequency Percent
positive effect 60 88,2
no effect 8 11,8
Total 68 100,0
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In 25 cases, positive incentives have a positive effect on firm performance, in 23 
cases, negative incentives have a positive effect, and in twelve cases, both types of 
incentives have a positive effect. In seven cases, positive incentives have no effect, 
and in one case, both sorts of incentives have no effect. 
 
Figure 19: Type of Incentive/Effect Frequencies 
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5.2 CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
I hypothesize that the type of incentive employed, optionally the number of positive 
incentives, the category of performance measures applied, and the incentives‟ effect 
on firm performance is correlated to the industry or country the study deals with and 
the period it was compiled in. For this purpose, I conduct a correlation analysis. 
The crosstabulations always show the count and the percentage of the variable in the 
column within the variable in the row. 
5.2.1 Industry 
5.2.1.1 Type of Incentive 
I notice that in research papers of sport and utility establishments, as well as in public 
organizations136, only the effect of dismissal is investigated. On the contrary, there 
are no disincentives explored in studies about charitable and insurance businesses. 
 
Figure 20: Concentrated Industry – Type of Incentive 
 
 
                                            
136 Here: provincial leaders 
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Table 4: Crosstabulation Industry – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
23 18 9 50
46,0% 36,0% 18,0% 100,0%
1 0 1 2
50,0% 0,0% 50,0% 100,0%
0 1 0 1
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 0 1 1
0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
4 0 0 4
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 1 1 3
33,3% 33,3% 33,3% 100,0%
0 1 0 1
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
2 0 1 3
66,7% 0,0% 33,3% 100,0%
0 1 0 1
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 0 1
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
insurance
manufacturing
provincial leaders
schools
soccer
utility
 
type of incentive
Total
industry
not specified
banking
basketball
charitable
hospitals
 
 
There is a very strong correlation between the industry and the incentive type 
inspected in the studies (Cramer‟s V = 0.4). 
 
Table 5: Industry – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,562 ,369
Cramer's V ,397 ,369
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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There also is a strong association between the industry and the number of positive 
incentives employed (eta = 0.37). 
 
Table 6: Industry – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
industry Dependent ,240
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,370
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 7: Concentrated Industry – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
industry concentrated 
Dependent
,244
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,349
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
5.2.1.2 Performance Measures 
Looking at the data of Cramer‟s V and eta, I diagnose very strong correlations 
between the industry and the category of performance measures applied and 
respectively, how many of these measures are consulted to evaluate firm 
performance. 
 
Table 8: Industry – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,496 ,081
Cramer's V ,496 ,081
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 9: Concentrated Industry – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,419 ,036
Cramer's V ,419 ,036
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Table 10: Industry – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
industry Dependent ,325
#EPR Dependent ,441
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 11: Concentrated Industry – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
industry concentrated 
Dependent
,303
#EPR Dependent ,408
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 12: Industry – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,625 ,003
Cramer's V ,625 ,003
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 13: Concentrated Industry – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,555 ,001
Cramer's V ,555 ,001
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 14: Industry – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
industry Dependent ,484
#MR Dependent ,496
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 15: Concentrated Industry – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
industry concentrated 
Dependent
,349
#MR Dependent ,451
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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Table 16: Industry – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,649 ,001
Cramer's V ,649 ,001
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 17: Concentrated Industry – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,562 ,001
Cramer's V ,562 ,001
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 18: Industry – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
industry Dependent ,541
#RR Dependent ,537
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 19: Concentrated Industry – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
industry concentrated 
Dependent
,496
#RR Dependent ,495
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 20: Industry – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,516 ,053
Cramer's V ,516 ,053
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 21: Concentrated Industry – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,423 ,033
Cramer's V ,423 ,033
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Table 22: Industry – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
industry Dependent ,210
#OR Dependent ,477
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 23: Concentrated Industry – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
industry concentrated 
Dependent
,080
#OR Dependent ,389
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
5.2.1.3 Effect 
Once more, 
o charitable, 
o utility and 
o sport organizations along with 
o hospitals, 
o schools and 
o commercial corporations 
stand out: reviews of these industries discover a positive effect of incentives on firm 
performance in all cases. 
 
Figure 21: Concentrated Industry – Effect 
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Table 24: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Effect 
positive effect no effect
44 6 50
88,0% 12,0% 100,0%
6 0 6
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
3 0 3
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
4 2 6
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
utility
Total
 
effect
Total
industry 
concentrated
not specified
charitable/education/
health/public
commercial
financial
sports
 
 
The value of Cramer‟s V reveals a strong relationship between industries and the 
effect on firm performance. 
 
Table 25: Industry – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,332 ,677
Cramer's V ,332 ,677
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 26: Concentrated Industry – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,251 ,508
Cramer's V ,251 ,508
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
5.2.1.4 Incentives/Effect 
The combination of positive incentives having a positive effect on company 
performance cannot be found in surveys on sport, utility or public establishments – in 
these industries, negative incentives have a positive effect on firm performance. 
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5.2.2 Country 
5.2.2.1 Type of Incentive 
Exclusively positive incentives are scrutinized in papers of 
o Bulgaria, 
o Israel, 
o Italy, 
o Korea, 
o Norway, and 
o the Philippines, 
whereas studies of 
o Denmark, 
o Finland, 
o Germany, 
o Russia, and 
o the Ukraine 
investigate exclusively negative incentives. 
 
Figure 22: Country – Type of Incentive 
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Table 27: Crosstabulation Country – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
1 1 0 2
50,0% 50,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 0 1 1
0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 2 0 3
33,3% 66,7% 0,0% 100,0%
0 3 1 4
0,0% 75,0% 25,0% 100,0%
0 2 0 2
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 0 1
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 0 1
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
3 2 1 6
50,0% 33,3% 16,7% 100,0%
1 0 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 0 1
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 0 1 1
0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
4 2 3 9
44,4% 22,2% 33,3% 100,0%
16 7 6 29
55,2% 24,1% 20,7% 100,0%
0 1 0 1
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
UK
US
Ukraine
Total
Korea
Norway
Philippines
Russia
Slovak Republic
UK and US
Japan
 
type of incentive
Total
country
not specified
Bulgaria
Canada
China
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Israel
Italy
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The value of Cramer‟s V demonstrates that there is a very strong correlation between 
the study‟s country and the incentive type looked at. 
 
Table 28: Country – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,736 ,524
Cramer's V ,520 ,524
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
In addition, there is a very strong association between the country and the number of 
positive incentives employed (eta = 0.57). 
 
Table 29: Country – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
country Dependent ,318
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,565
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
5.2.2.2 Performance Measures 
Similar to industries, the relationships between the country and the category of 
performance measures applied and respectively, how many of these measures are 
consulted to evaluate firm performance, are very strong. 
 
Table 30: Country – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,530 ,451
Cramer's V ,530 ,451
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 31: Country – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
country Dependent ,204
#EPR Dependent ,682
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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Table 32: Country – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,653 ,067
Cramer's V ,653 ,067
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 33: Country – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
country Dependent ,148
#MR Dependent ,587
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 34: Country – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,505 ,565
Cramer's V ,505 ,565
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 35: Country – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
country Dependent ,418
#RR Dependent ,552
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 36: Country – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,607 ,158
Cramer's V ,607 ,158
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Country – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
country Dependent ,225
#OR Dependent ,617
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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5.2.2.3 Effect 
Due to a small sample size per country with the exception of the UK and the US, I 
discover either a positive or no effect of incentives on firm performance for most 
countries. I spot no effect of incentives on company performance in studies of 
Bulgaria, Norway, the Slovak Republic, the UK and the US. 
 
Figure 23: Country – Effect 
 
 
Still, Cramer‟s V depicts a very strong correlation between the country and the effect 
of incentives on firm performance (Cramer‟s V = 0.7). 
 
Table 37: Country – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,702 ,021
Cramer's V ,702 ,021
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Table 38: Crosstabulation Country – Effect 
positive effect no effect
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
3 0 3
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
4 0 4
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
6 0 6
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
8 1 9
88,9% 11,1% 100,0%
26 3 29
89,7% 10,3% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
UK
US
Ukraine
Total
Korea
Norway
Philippines
Russia
Slovak Republic
UK and US
Japan
 
effect
Total
country
not specified
Bulgaria
Canada
China
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Israel
Italy
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5.2.3 Continent/Region 
5.2.3.1 Type of Incentive 
The allocation of the different incentive types with regard to continents gives a less 
diversified impression. Apart from Eurasia137, I observe both positive and negative 
incentives as well as a combination of the two for all continents. 
 
Table 39: Crosstabulation Continent – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
2 1 0 3
66,7% 33,3% 0,0% 100,0%
16 7 7 30
53,3% 23,3% 23,3% 100,0%
7 4 1 12
58,3% 33,3% 8,3% 100,0%
0 1 0 1
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
7 10 5 22
31,8% 45,5% 22,7% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
 
type of incentive
Total
continent
not specified
America
Asia
Eurasia
Europe
 
 
Figure 24: Continent – Type of Incentive 
 
 
                                            
137 As a result of a single Russian study being the only Eurasian research paper according to 
my classification. 
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Table 40: Crosstabulation Region – Type of Incentive 
 
positive negative both
2 1 0 3
66,7% 33,3% 0,0% 100,0%
16 7 7 30
53,3% 23,3% 23,3% 100,0%
7 4 1 12
58,3% 33,3% 8,3% 100,0%
1 5 2 8
12,5% 62,5% 25,0% 100,0%
6 6 3 15
40,0% 40,0% 20,0% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
type of incentive
Total
region
not specified
America
Asia
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
 
 
Figure 25: Region – Type of Incentive 
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Correspondingly, the value of Cramer‟s V depicts a rather moderate association 
between the continent and respectively, the region the study can be assigned to and 
the type of incentive looked at. 
 
Table 41: Continent – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,331 ,489
Cramer's V ,234 ,489
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 42: Region – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,339 ,450
Cramer's V ,240 ,450
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Additionally, there is a moderately strong relationship between the continent or the 
region and the number of positive incentives utilized (eta = 0.3). 
 
Table 43: Continent – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
continent Dependent ,300
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,296
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 44: Region – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
region Dependent ,285
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,300
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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5.2.3.2 Performance Measures 
I identify weak to very strong correlations between the continent and respectively, the 
region and the category of performance measures applied and respectively, how 
many of these measures are consulted to evaluate firm performance. 
 
Table 45: Continent – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,151 ,819
Cramer's V ,151 ,819
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 46: Region – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,286 ,235
Cramer's V ,286 ,235
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 47: Continent – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
continent Dependent ,191
#EPR Dependent ,136
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 48: Region – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
region Dependent ,124
#EPR Dependent ,367
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 49: Continent – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,324 ,128
Cramer's V ,324 ,128
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Meta-Analysis  
61 
Table 50: Region – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,408 ,023
Cramer's V ,408 ,023
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 51: Continent – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
continent Dependent ,292
#MR Dependent ,330
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 52: Region – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
region Dependent ,249
#MR Dependent ,372
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 53: Continent – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,257 ,342
Cramer's V ,257 ,342
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 54: Region – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,257 ,344
Cramer's V ,257 ,344
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 55: Continent – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
continent Dependent ,250
#RR Dependent ,212
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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Table 56: Region – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
region Dependent ,245
#RR Dependent ,218
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 57: Continent – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,449 ,008
Cramer's V ,449 ,008
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 58: Region – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,498 ,002
Cramer's V ,498 ,002
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 59: Continent – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
continent Dependent ,437
#OR Dependent ,454
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 60: Region – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
region Dependent ,376
#OR Dependent ,532
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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5.2.3.3 Effect 
In terms of the impact of incentives on firm performance, Asia and Eurasia stand out: 
I ascertain a positive effect on firm performance for them in all cases. 
 
Figure 26: Continent – Effect 
 
 
Table 61: Crosstabulation Continent – Effect 
positive effect no effect
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
27 3 30
90,0% 10,0% 100,0%
12 0 12
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
18 4 22
81,8% 18,2% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
 
effect
Total
continent
not specified
America
Asia
Eurasia
Europe
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Table 62: Crosstabulation Region – Effect 
 
positive effect no effect
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
27 3 30
90,0% 10,0% 100,0%
12 0 12
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
6 2 8
75,0% 25,0% 100,0%
13 2 15
86,7% 13,3% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
effect
Total
region
not specified
America
Asia
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
 
 
Figure 27: Region – Effect 
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Nevertheless, I find only a moderately strong association between the continent or 
the region and the incentives‟ effect on company performance. 
 
Table 63: Continent – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,244 ,401
Cramer's V ,244 ,401
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 64: Region – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,255 ,352
Cramer's V ,255 ,352
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
5.2.4 Decade/Era 
Several research papers I dealt with span multiple decades. As a consequence, my 
analysis includes them in every single decade they cover. 
5.2.4.1 Incentive Type 
The distribution of incentive types is very balanced across the two eras. 
 
Table 65: Crosstabulation Era – Type of Incentive 
 
positive negative both
14 11 5 30
46,7% 36,7% 16,7% 100,0%
18 12 8 38
47,4% 31,6% 21,1% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
type of incentive
Total
era
pre 1990
post 1990
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Figure 28: Era – Type of Incentive 
 
 
As a result, there is only a very weak correlation between the era the study was 
composed in and the incentive type, as well as the number of positive incentives 
(Cramer‟s V = 0.07, eta = 0.001). 
 
Table 66: Era – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,066 ,861
Cramer's V ,066 ,861
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 67: Era – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
era Dependent ,307
number of positive incentives 
Dependent
,001
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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I have only one study covering the 1940s in my pool. It investigates exclusively 
positive incentives. Needless to say, there is only a very weak correlation between a 
study covering the 1940s and the incentive type and correspondingly, how many 
sorts of positive incentives are adopted (Cramer‟s V = 0.13, eta = 0.22). 
 
Table 68: 1940s – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,130 ,565
Cramer's V ,130 ,565
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 69: 1940s – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
1940s Dependent ,335
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,215
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
For the 1950s, there are two research papers which as well evaluate exclusively 
positive incentives. Once more, I find a somewhat weak association between the 
decade and the sort of incentive and respectively, the number of positive incentives 
established (Cramer‟s V = 0.19, eta = 0.26). 
 
Table 70: 1950s – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,185 ,314
Cramer's V ,185 ,314
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 71: 1950s – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
1950s Dependent ,346
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,256
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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I discover a moderately strong relationship between reviews including the 1960s and 
the incentive type and accordingly, the number of positive incentives exerted 
(Cramer‟s V = 0.27, eta = 0.26). 1960s papers also examine exclusively positive 
incentives. 
 
Table 72: Crosstabulation 1960s – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
28 23 13 64
43,8% 35,9% 20,3% 100,0%
4 0 0 4
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
 
type of incentive
Total
1960s
non-existent
existent
 
 
Table 73: 1960s – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,265 ,092
Cramer's V ,265 ,092
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 74: 1960s – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
1960s Dependent ,372
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,262
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Although the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s samples are larger, the data of Cramer‟s V 
denote merely a weak correlation between the decade and the type of incentive 
applied, along with a very weak association between the decades and the number of 
positive incentives analyzed. Relatively, the studies of the 1970s are the ones that 
analyze negative incentives most frequently. 
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Table 75: 1970s – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,162 ,411
Cramer's V ,162 ,411
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 76: 1970s – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
1970s Dependent ,330
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,012
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 77: 1980s – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,117 ,628
Cramer's V ,117 ,628
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 78: 1980s – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
1980s Dependent ,435
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,105
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 79: 1990s – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,145 ,488
Cramer's V ,145 ,488
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 80: 1990s – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
1990s Dependent ,252
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,057
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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In the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, there are considered both positive and 
negative incentives, as well as a combination of the two. 
For studies about the 2000s, I even find a very weak relationship between the 
decade and the type of incentive deployed, in addition to an equally weak association 
between the decade and the number of positive incentives probed (Cramer‟s V = 0.1, 
eta = 0.11). 
 
Table 81: 2000s – Type of Incentive 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,096 ,731
Cramer's V ,096 ,731
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 82: 2000s – Number of Positive Incentives 
Value
2000s Dependent ,241
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,114
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
5.2.4.2 Performance Measures 
There is a weak to moderately strong correlation between the era and the category of 
performance measures applied. 
 
Table 83: Era – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,132 ,276
Cramer's V ,132 ,276
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 84: Era – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
era Dependent ,220
#EPR Dependent ,204
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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Table 85: Era – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,212 ,081
Cramer's V ,212 ,081
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 86: Era – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
era Dependent ,288
#MR Dependent ,117
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 87: Era – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,034 ,778
Cramer's V ,034 ,778
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 88: Era – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
era Dependent ,348
#RR Dependent ,000
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 89: Era – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,260 ,032
Cramer's V ,260 ,032
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 90: Era – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
era Dependent ,268
#OR Dependent ,268
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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The values of phi and eta also indicate a very weak to weak relationship between all 
decades and the category of performance measures applied and respectively, how 
many of these measures are deployed to evaluate firm performance. 
 
In the 1970s nevertheless, there is a moderate correlation between the decade and 
revenue as well as other ratios (phi = 0.21, eta = 0.21) 
 
Table 91: 1970s – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,210 ,083
Cramer's V ,210 ,083
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 92: 1970s – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,210 ,083
Cramer's V ,210 ,083
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 93: 1970s – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
1970s Dependent ,212
#OR Dependent ,211
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
For 1980s papers, I find a very strong correlation with market ratios (phi = 0.41). 
 
Table 94: 1980s – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,410 ,001
Cramer's V ,410 ,001
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Studies covering the 1990s show a moderate association with other ratios, most 
likely because reviews in my pool dealing with charitable organizations or schools 
were composed in this decade (phi = 0.21). 
 
Table 95: 1990s – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,209 ,085
Cramer's V ,209 ,085
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 96: 1990s – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
1990s Dependent ,214
#OR Dependent ,214
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
For the 2000s, the value of eta signifies a moderately strong relationship with the 
number of efficiency/profitability ratios established (eta = 0.28). 
 
Table 97: 2000s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
2000s Dependent ,340
#EPR Dependent ,278
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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5.2.4.3 Effect 
The distribution of effects is rather balanced across the two eras. 
 
Table 98: Crosstabulation Era – Effect 
 
positive effect no effect
29 1 30
96,7% 3,3% 100,0%
31 7 38
81,6% 18,4% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
effect
Total
era
pre 1990
post 1990
 
 
Figure 29: Era – Effect 
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Therefore, the correlation between the era the study was composed in and the effect 
of incentives is moderate. 
 
Table 99: Era – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,233 ,055
Cramer's V ,233 ,055
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
The small number of 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s studies shows that positive incentives 
have a positive effect on firm performance. Again, the data of phi imply a very weak 
correlation between a paper covering the 1940s, 1950s or 1960s and the impact on 
firm performance it illustrates. 
 
Table 100: 1940s – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,045 ,713
Cramer's V ,045 ,713
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 101: 1950s – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,064 ,600
Cramer's V ,064 ,600
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 102: 1960s – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,091 ,452
Cramer's V ,091 ,452
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
In reviews about the 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s, a positive as well as no effect 
of the three different incentive types on company performance can be measured. 
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Once again, I find a very weak association between these decades and the effect on 
firm performance. 
 
Table 103: 1970s – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,073 ,547
Cramer's V ,073 ,547
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 104: 1980s – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,113 ,352
Cramer's V ,113 ,352
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 105: 1990s – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,145 ,231
Cramer's V ,145 ,231
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
For studies about the 2000s, I notice a strong correlation with the impact of 
incentives on firm performance (phi = 0.31). Besides, the 2000s are the decade that 
experiences no effect of incentives on firm performance most frequently. 
 
Table 106: 2000s – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,310 ,011
Cramer's V ,310 ,011
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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5.2.5 Type of Incentive 
5.2.5.1 Effect 
In my sample, negative incentives always have a positive effect on firm performance. 
Relatively, positive incentives are the type that most frequently has no effect on firm 
performance. 
 
Table 107: Crosstabulation Type of Incentive – Effect 
positive effect no effect
25 7 32
78,1% 21,9% 100,0%
23 0 23
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
12 1 13
92,3% 7,7% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
 
effect
Total
type of incentive
positive
negative
both
 
 
I find a strong correlation between incentive type and effect (Cramer‟s V = 0.31). 
There also is a strong correlation between the effect on firm performance and the 
number of positive incentives employed (eta = 0.31). 
 
Table 108: Type of Incentive – Effect 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,307 ,040
Cramer's V ,307 ,040
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 109: Number of Positive Incentives – Effect 
Value
effect Dependent ,376
number of positive 
incentives Dependent
,305
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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5.3 LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
5.3.1 Negative Incentives 
By means of a logistic regression I intend to uncover the factors instigating the 
decision to use negative incentives. The usage of negative incentives is encoded by 
1 (existent) and 0 (non-existent). Regressions with industry, country, and continent 
as the independent variable produced the poorest results, thus I selected 
concentrated industry, region, and era for the model. I chose Enter as the method for 
variable inclusion. For the concentrated industry and region variables, I chose a 
Deviation contrast with the first category being the reference category. For the era 
variable, I selected a Simple contrast with the first category being the reference 
category again. 
The logistic equation is 
 
 
 
Table 110: Categorical Variables Codings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
not specified 50 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000
charitable/education/health 6 1,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000
commercial 3 ,000 1,000 ,000 ,000 ,000
financial 6 ,000 ,000 1,000 ,000 ,000
sports 2 ,000 ,000 ,000 1,000 ,000
utility 1 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 1,000
not specified 3 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000
America 30 1,000 ,000 ,000 ,000
Asia 12 ,000 1,000 ,000 ,000
Eastern Europe 8 ,000 ,000 1,000 ,000
Western Europe 15 ,000 ,000 ,000 1,000
pre 1990 30 -,500
post 1990 38 ,500
era
 
Frequency
Parameter coding
industry concentrated
region
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Table 111: Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value
non-existent 0
existent 1
 
 
The Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients shows an insignificant improvement in the 
goodness of fit when changing from the null model to the fitted model. The proportion 
of the total variance of the outcome that is accounted for by the model is 24.6%. 
 
Table 112: Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 13,853 10 ,180
Block 13,853 10 ,180
Model 13,853 10 ,180
 
Step 1
 
 
Table 113: Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
1 80,179
a ,184 ,246
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 32
because maximum iterations has been reached.
Final solution cannot be found.
 
 
The insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow Test indicates that there is no difference 
between observed and model-predicted values, thus the model‟s estimates fit the 
data at an acceptable level. 
 
Table 114: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 3,638 6 ,725
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Table 115: Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 6 5,731 1 1,269 7
2 6 4,557 1 2,443 7
3 3 4,081 4 2,919 7
4 3 4,175 5 3,825 8
5 6 5,694 6 6,306 12
6 4 4,701 6 5,299 10
7 3 2,061 3 3,939 6
8 1 1,000 10 10,000 11
Step 1
 
negative incentives = non-
existent
negative incentives = 
existent Total
 
 
Table 116: Classification Tablea 
non-existent existent
non-existent 16 16 50,0
existent 9 27 75,0
Overall Percentage 63,2
a. The cut value is ,500
negative 
incentives
negative incentivesObserved
Step 1
Predicted
Percentage 
Correct
 
 
Table 117 shows that apart from region(3)138, none of the coefficients are significant. 
The odds ratios for the concentrated industry variable are extremely low for 
indconc(1), indconc(2), as well as indconc(3), and extremely high for indconc(4) and 
indconc(5). These extreme values arise from the sparse data in the crosstabulation 
of the concentrated industry and incentive type variables.139 The odds of negative 
incentives being investigated are insignificantly reduced by a factor of 0 if the study is 
about a commercial, financial, or public business. Conversely, the odds of negative 
incentives are insignificantly increased by a factor of 4,069,455,059.34 and 
4,448,494,453.26 in papers about sports and utility organizations. 
The odds of negative incentives being investigated are insignificantly reduced by 
0.699 and 0.514 compared to other regions if the study is American or Asian. On the 
other hand, Eastern European papers significantly increase the odds of negative 
incentives being used by a factor of 6.905 compared to the overall effect. The odds 
                                            
138 Eastern Europe 
139 See Table 200 
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for Western European studies are by a factor of 1.112 insignificantly higher 
compared to the grand mean of all regions. 
The odds of a study investigating negative incentives are insignificantly decreased by 
a factor of 0.638 if the study was composed after the year 1990 compared to a study 
from before 1990. 
 
Table 117: Variables in the Equation 
Lower Upper
indconc 2,416 5 ,789
indconc(1) -10,593 3314270,559 ,000 1 1,000 ,000 ,000 .
indconc(2) -10,239 3314270,559 ,000 1 1,000 ,000 ,000 .
indconc(3) -12,545 3314270,559 ,000 1 1,000 ,000 ,000 .
indconc(4) 22,127 11116401,397 ,000 1 1,000 4069455059,341 ,000 .
indconc(5) 22,216 14541303,061 ,000 1 1,000 4448494453,260 ,000 .
region 4,816 4 ,307
region(1) -,358 ,524 ,467 1 ,495 ,699 ,250 1,953
region(2) -,666 ,605 1,214 1 ,270 ,514 ,157 1,680
region(3) 1,932 ,945 4,178 1 ,041 6,905 1,083 44,032
region(4) ,106 ,571 ,035 1 ,853 1,112 ,363 3,407
era(1) -,449 ,604 ,553 1 ,457 ,638 ,195 2,084
Constant 11,204 3314270,559 ,000 1 1,000 73400,780
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: indconc, region, era.
Step 1
a
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
 
 
To avoid the problem of sparse data in the second model, I left out the concentrated 
industry variable. Again, I chose Enter as the method for variable inclusion and a 
Deviation contrast for the region variable as well as a Simple contrast for the era 
variable with the first category being the reference category. 
The logistic equation is 
 
 
 
Table 118: Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value
non-existent 0
existent 1
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Table 119: Categorical Variables Codings 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
not specified 3 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000
America 30 1,000 ,000 ,000 ,000
Asia 12 ,000 1,000 ,000 ,000
Eastern Europe 8 ,000 ,000 1,000 ,000
Western Europe 15 ,000 ,000 ,000 1,000
pre 1990 30 -,500
post 1990 38 ,500
era
 
Frequency
Parameter coding
region
 
 
According to the Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients, omitting the concentrated 
industry variable impairs the goodness of fit compared to the first model. The 
proportion of the total variance of the outcome that is accounted for by the model is 
13.5%. 
 
Table 120: Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 7,239 5 ,203
Block 7,239 5 ,203
Model 7,239 5 ,203
 
Step 1
 
 
Table 121: Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
1 86,794
a ,101 ,135
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5
because parameter estimates changed by less than
,001.
 
 
The insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow Test indicates that there is no difference 
between observed and model-predicted values, thus the model‟s estimates fit the 
data at an acceptable level. 
 
Table 122: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 5,081 6 ,533
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Table 123: Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 7 5,213 1 2,787 8
2 1 1,256 1 ,744 2
3 6 7,364 6 4,636 12
4 1 2,531 4 2,469 5
5 10 8,636 8 9,364 18
6 4 4,423 6 5,577 10
7 2 1,577 3 3,423 5
8 1 1,000 7 7,000 8
Step 1
negative incentives = non-
existent
negative incentives = 
existent Total
 
 
 
Table 124: Classification Tablea 
non-existent existent
non-existent 15 17 46,9
existent 12 24 66,7
Overall Percentage 57,4
a. The cut value is ,500
negative 
incentives
negative incentivesObserved
Step 1
Predicted
Percentage 
Correct
 
 
Table 125: Variables in the Equation 
Lower Upper
region 5,480 4 ,241
region(1) -,479 ,481 ,992 1 ,319 ,620 ,242 1,589
region(2) -,584 ,589 ,985 1 ,321 ,557 ,176 1,768
region(3) 1,930 ,935 4,262 1 ,039 6,890 1,103 43,051
region(4) ,216 ,557 ,150 1 ,698 1,241 ,417 3,695
era(1) -,544 ,548 ,985 1 ,321 ,581 ,198 1,699
Constant ,288 ,374 ,593 1 ,441 1,333
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: region, era.
Step 1
a
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
 
 
Again, apart from region(3)140, none of the coefficients are significant. The odds of 
negative incentives being investigated are insignificantly reduced by 0.620 and 0.557 
compared to other regions if the study is American or Asian. On the other hand, 
Eastern European papers significantly increase the odds of negative incentives being 
used by a factor of 6.890 compared to the overall effect. The odds for Western 
                                            
140 Eastern Europe 
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European studies are by a factor of 1.241 insignificantly higher compared to the 
grand mean of all regions. 
The odds of a study investigating negative incentives are insignificantly decreased by 
a factor of 0.581 if the study was composed after the year 1990 compared to a study 
from before 1990. 
5.3.2 Positive Incentives 
In addition, I intend to find out if there is a difference in the factors instigating the 
decision to use positive incentives compared to negative incentives. The usage of 
positive incentives is encoded by 1 (existent) and 0 (non-existent). Again, I chose 
Enter as the method for variable inclusion. For the concentrated industry and region 
variables I chose a Deviation contrast with the first category being the reference 
category. For the era variable I selected a Simple contrast with the first category 
being the reference category again. 
The logistic equation is 
 
 
 
Table 126: Categorical Variables Codings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
not specified 50 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000
charitable/education/health 6 1,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000
commercial 3 ,000 1,000 ,000 ,000 ,000
financial 6 ,000 ,000 1,000 ,000 ,000
sports 2 ,000 ,000 ,000 1,000 ,000
utility 1 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 1,000
not specified 3 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000
America 30 1,000 ,000 ,000 ,000
Asia 12 ,000 1,000 ,000 ,000
Eastern Europe 8 ,000 ,000 1,000 ,000
Western Europe 15 ,000 ,000 ,000 1,000
pre 1990 30 -,500
post 1990 38 ,500
era
 
Frequency
Parameter coding
industry concentrated
region
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Table 127: Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value
non-existent 0
existent 1
 
 
The Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients shows an insignificant improvement in the 
goodness of fit when changing from the null model to the fitted model. The proportion 
of the total variance of the outcome that is accounted for by the model is 30.1%. 
 
Table 128: Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 16,634 10 ,083
Block 16,634 10 ,083
Model 16,634 10 ,083
 
Step 1
 
 
Table 129: Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood
Cox & Snell R 
Square
Nagelkerke R 
Square
1 70,386
a ,217 ,301
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 32
because maximum iterations has been reached.
Final solution cannot be found.
 
 
The insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow Test indicates that there is no difference 
between observed and model-predicted values, thus the model‟s estimates fit the 
data at an acceptable level. 
 
Table 130: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 2,048 5 ,842
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Table 131: Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 8 8,000 3 3,000 11
2 3 3,521 5 4,479 8
3 5 3,942 7 8,058 12
4 1 1,796 5 4,204 6
5 3 3,143 8 7,857 11
6 3 2,116 7 7,884 10
7 0 ,482 10 9,518 10
Step 1
 
positive incentives = non-
existent
positive incentives = 
existent Total
 
 
Table 132: Classification Tablea 
non-existent existent
non-existent 8 15 34,8
existent 3 42 93,3
Overall Percentage 73,5
a. The cut value is ,500.
positive 
incentives
Step 1
Predicted
Percentage 
Correct
Observed positive incentives
 
 
Table 133 shows that none of the coefficients are significant. The odds ratios for the 
concentrated industry variable are, unlike the values for negative incentives, 
extremely high for indconc(1), indconc(2), as well as indconc(3), and extremely low 
for indconc(4) and indconc(5). These extreme values arise from the sparse data in 
the crosstabulation of the concentrated industry and incentive type variables.141 The 
odds of positive incentives being investigated are insignificantly increased by a factor 
of 377.97, 30,850,814,133,403,200, and 585.86 for studies of commercial, financial, 
and public businesses. In contrast, the odds of positive incentives are insignificantly 
reduced by a factor of 0 if the study is about sports or utility organizations. 
The odds of positive incentives being investigated are insignificantly reduced by 
0.287 compared to other regions if the study is based on Eastern Europe data. On 
the other hand, American papers insignificantly increase the odds of positive 
incentives being used by a factor of 2.126 compared to the overall effect. The odds of 
                                            
141 See Table 200 
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Asian and Western European studies are by a factor of 1.134 and 1.018 
insignificantly higher compared to the grand mean of all regions. 
The odds of a study investigating positive incentives are insignificantly increased by a 
factor of 1.78 if the study was composed after the year 1990 compared to a study 
from before 1990. 
 
Table 133: Variables in the Equation 
Lower Upper
region 3,921 4 ,417
region(1) ,754 ,558 1,825 1 ,177 2,126 ,712 6,349
region(2) ,125 ,607 ,043 1 ,836 1,134 ,345 3,724
region(3) -1,249 ,730 2,927 1 ,087 ,287 ,069 1,199
region(4) ,018 ,570 ,001 1 ,975 1,018 ,333 3,110
era(1) ,576 ,672 ,736 1 ,391 1,780 ,477 6,643
indconc ,166 5 ,999
indconc(1) 6,373 3587119,667 ,000 1 1,000 585,856 ,000 .
indconc(2) 5,935 3587119,667 ,000 1 1,000 377,967 ,000 .
indconc(3) 37,968 6297407,292 ,000 1 1,000 30850814133403200,000 ,000 .
indconc(4) -27,924 10328858,854 ,000 1 1,000 ,000 ,000 .
indconc(5) -28,230 14165175,884 ,000 1 1,000 ,000 ,000 .
Constant -5,427 3587119,667 ,000 1 1,000 ,004
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: region, era, indconc.
Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Step 1
a
 B S.E. Wald df
 
 
Again, I left out the concentrated industry variable and chose Enter as the method for 
variable inclusion as well as a Deviation contrast for the region variable and a Simple 
contrast for the era variable with the first category being the reference category for 
the second model. 
The logistic equation is 
 
 
 
Table 134: Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value
non-existent 0
existent 1
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Table 135: Categorical Variables Codings 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
not specified 3 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000
America 30 1,000 ,000 ,000 ,000
Asia 12 ,000 1,000 ,000 ,000
Eastern Europe 8 ,000 ,000 1,000 ,000
Western Europe 15 ,000 ,000 ,000 1,000
pre 1990 30 -,500
post 1990 38 ,500
era
 
Frequency
Parameter coding
region
 
 
According to the Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients, omitting the concentrated 
industry variable impairs the goodness of fit compared to the first model. The 
proportion of the total variance of the outcome that is accounted for by the model is 
13%. 
 
Table 136: Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 6,703 5 ,244
Block 6,703 5 ,244
Model 6,703 5 ,244
 
Step 1
 
 
Table 137: Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood
Cox & Snell R 
Square
Nagelkerke R 
Square
1 80,317
a ,094 ,130
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5
because parameter estimates changed by less than
,001.
 
 
The insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow Test indicates that there is no difference 
between observed and model-predicted values, thus the model‟s estimates fit the 
data at an acceptable level. 
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Table 138: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 1,643 5 ,896
 
 
Table 139: Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 5 5,000 3 3,000 8
2 2 2,714 3 2,286 5
3 4 3,031 3 3,969 7
4 4 3,286 6 6,714 10
5 5 5,256 13 12,744 18
6 1 1,758 6 5,242 7
7 2 1,956 11 11,044 13
Step 1
positive incentives = non-
existent
positive incentives = 
existent Total
 
 
 
Table 140: Classification Tablea 
non-existent existent
non-existent 7 16 30,4
existent 6 39 86,7
Overall Percentage 67,6
a. The cut value is ,500.
positive 
incentives
Step 1
Predicted
Percentage 
Correct
Observed positive incentives
 
 
Table 141: Variables in the Equation 
Lower Upper
region 5,942 4 ,204
region(1) ,895 ,508 3,102 1 ,078 2,447 ,904 6,623
region(2) ,216 ,595 ,132 1 ,716 1,241 ,387 3,981
region(3) -1,387 ,720 3,708 1 ,054 ,250 ,061 1,025
region(4) -,162 ,544 ,089 1 ,766 ,850 ,293 2,471
era(1) ,886 ,618 2,055 1 ,152 2,425 ,722 8,139
Constant ,434 ,345 1,582 1 ,209 1,543
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: region, era.
Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Step 1
a
 B S.E. Wald df
 
 
Again, none of the coefficients are significant. The odds of positive incentives being 
investigated are insignificantly increased by 2.447 and 1.241 compared to other 
regions if the study is American or Asian. On the other hand, Eastern and Western 
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European papers insignificantly reduce the odds of positive incentives being used by 
a factor of 0.25 and 0.85 compared to the overall effect. 
The odds of a study investigating positive incentives are insignificantly increased by a 
factor of 2.425 if the study was composed after the year 1990 compared to a study 
from before 1990. 
5.3.3 Positive Effect 
By means of a logistic regression I intend to uncover which type of incentive is more 
likely to result in a positive effect on firm performance. The occurrence of a positive 
effect is encoded by 1 (existent) and 0 (non-existent). I chose Enter as the method 
for variable inclusion and an Indicator contrast for the incentive type with the category 
“both” being the reference category. 
The logistic equation is 
 
 
 
Table 142: Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value
non-existent 0
existent 1
 
 
Table 143: Categorical Variables Codings 
(1) (2)
positive 32 1,000 ,000
negative 23 ,000 1,000
both 13 ,000 ,000
 
Frequency
Parameter coding
type of incentive
 
 
The Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients shows a significant improvement in the 
goodness of fit when changing from the null model to the fitted model. The proportion 
of the total variance of the outcome that is accounted for by the model is 23%. 
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Table 144: Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 8,589 2 ,014
Block 8,589 2 ,014
Model 8,589 2 ,014
 
Step 1
 
 
Table 145: Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
1 40,671
a ,119 ,230
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 32
because maximum iterations has been reached.
Final solution cannot be found.
 
 
The insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow Test indicates that there is no difference 
between observed and model-predicted values, thus the model‟s estimates fit the 
data at an acceptable level. 
 
Table 146: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 ,000 1 1,000
 
 
Table 147: Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 7 7,000 25 25,000 32
2 1 1,000 12 12,000 13
3 0 ,000 23 23,000 23
Step 1
 
positive effect = non-existent positive effect = existent
Total
 
 
Table 148: Classification Tablea 
non-existent existent
non-existent 0 8 ,0
existent 0 60 100,0
Overall Percentage 88,2
a. The cut value is ,500
Predicted
Observed positive effect
positive effect
Step 1
Percentage 
Correct
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Table 149 shows that none of the coefficients are significant. The odds of a positive 
effect are insignificantly reduced by a factor of 0.298 if positive incentives are 
employed. On the contrary, the odds of a positive effect are insignificantly increased 
by a factor of 21,910,522,612,363.1 if negative incentives are used. 
 
Table 149: Variables in the Equation 
Lower Upper
incentivetype 1,160 2 ,560
incentivetype(1) -1,212 1,125 1,160 1 ,281 ,298 ,033 2,701
incentivetype(2) 30,718 3393841,130 ,000 1 1,000 21910522612363,100 ,000 .
Constant 2,485 1,041 5,700 1 ,017 12,000
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: incentivetype.
Step 1
a
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
 
5.3.4 No Effect 
In addition, I aim to find out which type of incentive is more likely to cause no effect 
on firm performance. The occurrence of no effect is encoded by 1 (existent) and 0 
(non-existent). I chose Enter as the method for variable inclusion and an Indicator 
contrast for the incentive type with the category “both” being the reference category. 
The logistic equation is 
 
 
 
Table 150: Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value
non-existent 0
existent 1
 
 
Table 151: Categorical Variables Codings 
(1) (2)
positive 32 1,000 ,000
negative 23 ,000 1,000
both 13 ,000 ,000
 
Frequency
Parameter coding
type of 
incentive
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The Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients shows a significant improvement in the 
goodness of fit when changing from the null model to the fitted model. The proportion 
of the total variance of the outcome that is accounted for by the model is 23%. 
 
Table 152: Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 8,589 2 ,014
Block 8,589 2 ,014
Model 8,589 2 ,014
 
Step 1
 
 
Table 153: Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
1 40,671 ,119 ,230
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 32
because maximum iterations has been reached.
Final solution cannot be found.
 
 
The insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow Test indicates that there is no difference 
between observed and model-predicted values, thus the model‟s estimates fit the 
data at an acceptable level. 
 
Table 154: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 ,000 1 1,000
 
 
Table 155: Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 23 23,000 0 ,000 23
2 12 12,000 1 1,000 13
3 25 25,000 7 7,000 32
Step 1
 
no effect = non-existent no effect = existent
Total
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Table 156: Classification Table 
non-existent existent
non-existent 60 0 100,0
existent 8 0 ,0
Overall Percentage 88,2
a. The cut value is ,500
Percentage 
Correct
Observed no effect
no effect
Step 1
Predicted
 
 
Table 157 shows that none of the coefficients are significant. The odds of no effect 
on firm performance are insignificantly increased by a factor of 3.36 if positive 
incentives are employed. On the contrary, the odds of no effect are insignificantly 
reduced by a factor of 0 if negative incentives are used. 
 
Table 157: Variables in the Equation 
Lower Upper
incentivetype 1,160 2 ,560
incentivetype(1) 1,212 1,125 1,160 1 ,281 3,360 ,370 30,490
incentivetype(2) -30,718 3381061,522 ,000 1 1,000 ,000 ,000 .
Constant -2,485 1,041 5,700 1 ,017 ,083
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: incentivetype.
Step 1a
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
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6. SUMMARY 
By means of a meta-analysis of sixty studies, the thesis investigated the efficiency of 
the two major incentive systems positive vs. negative incentives, i.e. bonus vs. 
dismissal. Its major aim was to identify the more useful framework from an economic 
point of view and bring to light which one leads to better firm performance. 
Interestingly, disincentives always have a positive effect on firm performance 
according to the analysis. Relatively, positive incentives are the type that most 
frequently has no effect on firm performance. There is a strong correlation between 
the incentive type and its effect on firm performance. 
The estimates of the logistic regression confirm that positive incentives reduce the 
odds of a positive effect on firm performance. They increase the odds of no effect. 
Conversely, negative incentives increase the odds of a positive effect whereas they 
decrease the odds of no effect. 
According to the present analysis, dismissal seems to be the more useful framework 
of incentives from an economic point of view in order to achieve a positive effect on 
firm performance. 
 
Additionally, the thesis intended to identify the relevant factors affecting the 
implementation of a particular incentive scheme. Consistent with Chapter 4, the 
correlation analysis finds associations and differences across industries, countries, 
continents, regions, and time periods regarding the incentive type, its effect on firm 
performance, and how company performance is measured. 
According to the correlation analysis, the country and the industry of a study show 
the strongest correlations with the type of incentive and performance measures used, 
as well as the effect on firm performance detected. 
On the other hand, there are no or merely weak correlations between the continent 
as well as the time period the paper was composed in and the incentive type and 
performance measures employed or the effect measured. 
Predictably, the factors that increase the odds of negative incentives being employed 
reduce the odds of positive incentives being used and vice versa. 
The commercial, financial and public industries reduce the odds of negative 
incentives while they increase the odds of positive incentives being employed. The 
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sports and utility industries increase the odds of negative incentives whereas they 
decrease the odds of positive incentives being used. 
The odds of negative incentives are reduced and the odds of positive incentives are 
increased if a study is American or Asian. An Eastern or Western European paper 
increases the odds of negative incentives being employed while it decreases the 
odds of positive incentives. 
Post-1990s studies result in reduced odds of negative incentives being investigated 
whereas they cause increased odds of positive incentives. 
 
This thesis omits notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, 
and culture. In the real world, however, considering incentives from an exclusively 
economic standpoint is insufficient. 
 
“Rewards are what your employees think they are.”142 
 
In terms of an integrated notion of incentive compensation for executives it will 
become increasingly important to find out what rewards are to them. This may 
include flexible working hours and facilitating the reconcilement of career and family 
life. Personalized and long-term incentive schemes will probably become more 
popular as decision makers become aware of the fact that pecuniary incentives alone 
are not enough. 
                                            
142 Havranek, Mauhart (2010), 10 
References  
97 
REFERENCES 
LITERATURE 
Abe, Y. (1997). Chief Executive Turnover and Firm Performance in Japan. Journal of 
the Japanese and International Economies 11, 2-26. 
Ang, J. S., Constand, R. L. (1997). Compensation and performance: the case of 
Japanese managers and directors. Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management 7, 275-304. 
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and Incentives: 
Practice vs. Theory. The Journal of Finance XLIII (3), 593-616. 
Baron, J. N., Kreps, D. M. (1999). Strategic Human Resources: Frameworks for 
General Managers. New York: John Wiley Sons. 
Bebchuk, L. A., Fried, J. (2004). Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 
Becker, F. G., Kramarsch, M. H. (2006). Leistungs- und erfolgsorientierte Vergütung 
für Führungskräfte. Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Blackwell, D. W., Dudney, D. M., Farrell, K. A. (2007). Changes in CEO 
compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO 
turnover. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 29 (3), 315-338. 
Boschen, J. F., Duru, A., Gordon, L. A., Smith, K. J. (2003). Accounting and Stock 
Price Performance in Dynamic CEO Compensation Arrangements. The 
Accounting Review 78 (1), 143-168. 
Brickley, J. A., Van Horn, R. L. (2002). Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit 
Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals. Journal of Law and Economics 45 (1), 
227-249. 
References  
98 
Brunello, G., Graziano, C., Parigi, B. (2001). Executive compensation and firm 
performance in Italy. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 133–
161. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S. (1999). Enterprise performance and management 
turnover in the Czech Republic. European Economic Review 43, 1115-1124. 
Coakley, J., Iliopoulou, S. (2006). Bidder CEO and Other Executive Compensation in 
UK M&As. European Financial Management 12 (4), 609-631. 
Conyon, M. J. (1998). Directors' Pay and Turnover: An Application to a Sample of 
Large UK Firms. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 60 (4), 485-507. 
Conyon, M. J., Murphy, K. J. (2000). The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the 
United States and United Kingdom. The Economic Journal 110 (467), F640-
F671. 
Conyon, M. J., Nicolitsas, D. (1998). Does the Market for Top Executives Work? CEO 
Pay and Turnover in Small U.K. Companies. Small Business Economics 11, 
145–154. 
Cosh, A. (1975). The Remuneration of Chief Executives in the United Kingdom. The 
Economic Journal 85 (337), 75-94. 
Deckop, J. R. (1988). Determinants of Chief Executive Officer Compensation. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 41 (2), 215-226. 
Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K. (1995). Performance Changes Following Top Management 
Dismissals. The Journal of Finance 50 (4), 1029-1057. 
Eberts, R., Hollenbeck, K., Stone, J. (2002). Teacher Performance Incentives and 
Student Outcomes. The Journal of Human Resources 37 (4), 913-927. 
Eriksson, T. (2005). Managerial pay and executive turnover in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics. Economics of Transition 13 (4), 659–677. 
References  
99 
Eriksson, T., Strojer Madsen, E., Dilling-Hansen, M., Smith, V. (2001). Determinants 
of CEO and Board Turnover. Empirica 28 (3), 243-257. 
Fidrmuc, J. P., Fidrmuc, J. (2007). Fire the manager to improve performance? 
Managerial turnover and incentives after privatization in the Czech Republic. 
Economics of Transition 15 (3), 505–533. 
Figlio, D. N., Kenny, L. W. (2007). Individual teacher incentives and student 
performance. Journal of Public Economics 91, 901-914. 
Firth, M., Fung, P. M., Rui, O. M. (2006). Corporate performance and CEO 
compensation in China. Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 693-714. 
Firth, M., Lohne, J. C., Ropstad, R., Sjo, J. (1996). The Remuneration of CEOs and 
Corporate Financial Performance in Norway. Managerial and Decision 
Economics 17 (3), 291-301. 
Gibbons, R., Murphy, K. J. (1990). Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief 
Executive Officers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (3), 30S-51S. 
Gilson, S. C., Vetsuypens, M. R. (1993). CEO Compensation in Financially 
Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Finance 48 (2), 425-
458. 
Hadlock, C. J., Lumer, G. B. (1997). Compensation, Turnover, and Top Management 
Incentives: Historical Evidence. The Journal of Business 70 (2), 153-187. 
Havranek, C., Mauhart, J. (2010). Gehalt und Leistungen managen (2. Ausg.). Wien: 
Linde Verlag. 
Jensen, M. C., Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives. The Journal of Political Economy 98 (2), 225-264. 
Jones, D. C., Kato, T. (1996). The determinants of chief executive compensation in 
transitional economies: Evidence from Bulgaria. Labour Economics 3, 319-336. 
References  
100 
Ju, M. (2007). Deferred Executive Compensation Policies in Chinese State-owned 
Enterprises. China World Economy 15 (4), 102-117. 
Kang, J.-K., Shivdasani, A. (1995). Firm performance, corporate governance, and top 
executive turnover in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 38, 29-58. 
Kaplan, S. N. (1994). Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison 
of Japan and the United States. The Journal of Political Economy 102 (3), 510-
546, (qtd. 1994a). 
Kaplan, S. N. (1994). Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany. 
Journal of Law, Economics, Organization 10 (1), 142-159, (qtd. 1994b). 
Kapur, S., Timmermann, A. (2005). Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and 
Asset Market Equilibrium. The Economic Journal 115, 1077–1102. 
Kasper, H., Mayrhofer, W. (2009). Personalmanagement - Führung - Organisation (4. 
Ausg.). (H. Kasper, W. Mayrhofer, Eds.) Wien: Linde Verlag. 
Kato, T., Kim, W., Lee, J. H. (2007). Executive compensation, firm performance, and 
Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal 15, 36–55. 
Kim, Y. (1996). Long-Term Firm Performance and Chief Executive Turnover: An 
Empirical Study of the Dynamics. Journal of Law, Economics, Organization 12 
(2), 480-496. 
Lausten, M. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: 
empirical evidence on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 20, 391–414. 
Lavy, V. (2002). Evaluating the Effect of Teachers' Group Performance Incentives on 
Pupil Achievement. The Journal of Political Economy 110 (6), 1286-1317. 
Lazear, E. P., Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor 
Contracts. The Journal of Political Economy 89 (5), 841-864. 
References  
101 
Lewellen, W., Loderer, C., Martin, K., Blum, G. (1992). Executive Compensation and 
the Performance of the Firm. Managerial and Decision Economics 13 (1), 65-
74. 
Li, H., Zhou, L.-A. (2005). Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive 
role of personnel control in China. Journal of Public Economics 89, 1743– 1762. 
Main, B. G. (1991). Top Executive Pay and Performance. Managerial and Decision 
Economics 12 (3), 219-229. 
Maury, B. (2006). Corporate Performance, Corporate Governance and Top Executive 
Turnover in Finland. European Financial Management 12 (2), 221–248. 
Mayrhofer, W. (2009). Motivation und Arbeitsverhalten. (H. Kasper, W. Mayrhofer, 
Eds.) Personalmanagement - Führung – Organisation, 51-130. 
McNeil, C., Niehaus, G., Powers, E. (2004). Management turnover in subsidiaries of 
conglomerates versus stand-alone firms. Journal of Financial Economics 72 
(72), 63–96. 
Mishra, C. S., McConaughy, D. L., Gobeli, D. H. (2000). Effectiveness of CEO pay-
for-performance. Review of Financial Economics 9, 1-13. 
Mueller, D. C. (2003). The Corporation: Investment, Mergers, and Growth. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
Muravyev, A. (2003). Turnover of Senior Managers in Russian Privatised Firms. 
Comparative Economic Studies 45 (2), 148–172. 
Muravyev, A., Bilyk, O., Grechaniuk, B. (2009). Firm Performance and Managerial 
Turnover: The Case of Ukraine. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4372. 
Parrino, R. (1997). CEO turnover and outside succession: A cross-sectional analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics 46, 165-197. 
References  
102 
Ryan, H. E., Wiggins, R. A. (2001). The influence of firm- and manager-specific 
characteristics on the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 7, 101–123. 
The Economist 335 (1995), qtd. in: Conyon, M. J., Nicolitsas, D. (1998). Does the 
Market for Top Executives Work? CEO Pay and Turnover in Small U.K. 
Companies. Small Business Economics 11, 145–154. 
Unite, A. A., Sullivan, M. J., Brookman, J., Majadillas, M. A., Taningco, A. (2008). 
Executive pay and firm performance in the Philippines. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal 16, 606-623. 
Weisbach, M. S. (2007). Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power: A 
Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried‟s Pay without Performance: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Journal of Economic Literature 
XLV, 419-428. 
Zhou, X. (2000). CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from 
Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics 33 (1), 213-251. 
 
INTERNET REFERENCES 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2010). Retrieved June 16, 2010 from: 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incentive 
Wikipedia. (2010, May 17). Retrieved June 16, 2010 from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incentive#cite_note-0 
Studies in the Meta-Analysis  
103 
STUDIES IN THE META-ANALYSIS 
Abe, Y. (1997). Chief Executive Turnover and Firm Performance in Japan. Journal of 
the Japanese and International Economies 11, 2-26. 
Abowd, J. M. (1990). Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect 
Corporate Performance? Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (3), 52S-
73S. 
Aivazian, V. A., Ge, Y., Qiu, J. (2005). Corporate governance and manager turnover: 
An unusual social experiment. Journal of Banking Finance 29, 1459–1481. 
Ang, J. S., Constand, R. L. (1997). Compensation and performance: the case of 
Japanese managers and directors. Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management 7, 275-304. 
Audas, R., Dobson, S., Goddard, J. (1999). Organizational performance and 
managerial turnover. Managerial and Decision Economics 20 (6), 305-318. 
Baber, W. R., Daniel, P. L., Roberts, A. A. (2002). Compensation to Managers of 
Charitable Organizations: An Empirical Study of the Role of Accounting 
Measures of Program Activities. The Accounting Review 77 (3), 679-693. 
Barro, J. R., Barro, R. J. (1990). Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs. 
Journal of Labor Economics 8 (4), 448-481. 
Bilyk, O., Grechaniuk, B., Muravyev, A., Talavera, O. (2009). Firm Performance and 
Managerial Turnover: The Case of Ukraine. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4372 . 
Blackwell, D. W., Dudney, D. M., Farrell, K. A. (2007). Changes in CEO 
compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO 
turnover. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 29 (3), 315-338. 
Boschen, J. F., Smith, K. J. (1995). You Can Pay Me Now and You Can Pay Me 
Later: The Dynamic Response of Executive Compensation to Firm 
Performance. The Journal of Business 68 (4), 577-608. 
Studies in the Meta-Analysis  
104 
Boschen, J. F., Duru, A., Gordon, L. A., Smith, K. J. (2003). Accounting and Stock 
Price Performance in Dynamic CEO Compensation Arrangements. The 
Accounting Review 78 (1), 143-168. 
Brickley, J. A., Van Horn, R. L. (2002). Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit 
Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals. Journal of Law and Economics 45 (1), 
227-249. 
Brunello, G., Graziano, C., Parigi, B. (2001). Executive compensation and firm 
performance in Italy. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 133–
161. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S. (1999). Enterprise performance and management 
turnover in the Czech Republic. European Economic Review (43), 1115-1124. 
Coakley, J., Iliopoulou, S. (2006). Bidder CEO and Other Executive Compensation in 
UK M&As. European Financial Management 12 (4), 609-631. 
Conyon, M. J. (1997). Corporate governance and executive compensation. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 15, 493-509. 
Conyon, M. J. (1998). Directors' Pay and Turnover: An Application to a Sample of 
Large UK Firms. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 60 (4), 485-507. 
Conyon, M. J., Murphy, K. J. (2000). The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the 
United States and United Kingdom. The Economic Journal 110 (467), F640-
F671. 
Conyon, M. J., Nicolitsas, D. (1998). Does the Market for Top Executives Work? CEO 
Pay and Turnover in Small U.K. Companies. Small Business Economics 11, 
145–154. 
Cosh, A. (1975). The Remuneration of Chief Executives in the United Kingdom. The 
Economic Journal 85 (337), 75-94. 
Studies in the Meta-Analysis  
105 
Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K. (1995). Performance Changes Following Top Management 
Dismissals. The Journal of Finance 50 (4), 1029-1057. 
Eberts, R., Hollenbeck, K., Stone, J. (2002). Teacher Performance Incentives and 
Student Outcomes. The Journal of Human Resources 37 (4), 913-927. 
Eriksson, T. (2005). Managerial pay and executive turnover in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics. Economics of Transition 13 (4), 659–677. 
Eriksson, T., Madsen, E. S., Dilling-Hansen, M., Smith, V. (2001). Determinants of 
CEO and Board Turnover. Empirica 28 (3), 243-257. 
Fidrmuc, J. P., Fidrmuc, J. (2006). Can you teach old dogs new tricks? On 
complementarity of human capital and incentives. Journal of International 
Money and Finance 25, 445-458. 
Fidrmuc, J. P., Fidrmuc, J. (2007). Fire the manager to improve performance? 
Managerial turnover and incentives after privatization in the Czech Republic. 
Economics of Transition 15 (3), 505–533. 
Figlio, D. N., Kenny, L. W. (2007). Individual teacher incentives and student 
performance. Journal of Public Economics 91, 901-914. 
Firth, M., Fung, P. M., Rui, O. M. (2006). Corporate performance and CEO 
compensation in China. Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 693-714. 
Firth, M., Lohne, J. C., Ropstad, R., Sjo, J. (1996). The Remuneration of CEOs and 
Corporate Financial Performance in Norway. Managerial and Decision 
Economics 17 (3), 291-301. 
Fizel, J. L., D'Itri, M. P. (1997). Managerial Efficiency, Managerial Succession and 
Organizational Performance. Managerial and Decision Economics 18 (4), 295-
308. 
Franks, J., Mayer, C., Renneboog, L. (2001). Who Disciplines Management in Poorly 
Performing Companies? Journal of Financial Intermediation 10, 209–248. 
Studies in the Meta-Analysis  
106 
Gibbons, R., Murphy, K. J. (1990). Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief 
Executive Officers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (3), 30S-51S. 
Gilson, S. C., Vetsuypens, M. R. (1993). CEO Compensation in Financially 
Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Finance 48 (2), 425-
458. 
Hadlock, C. J., Lee, D. S., Parrino, R. (2002). Chief Executive Officer Careers in 
Regulated Environments: Evidence from Electric and Gas Utilities. Journal of 
Law and Economics 45 (2), 535-563. 
Hubbard, R. G., Palia, D. (1995). Executive pay and performance: Evidence from the 
U.S. banking industry. Journal of Financial Economics 39, 105-130. 
Jones, D. C., Kato, T. (1996). The determinants of chief executive compensation in 
transitional economies: Evidence from Bulgaria. Labour Economics 3, 319-336. 
Kang, J.-K., Shivdasani, A. (1995). Firm performance, corporate governance, and top 
executive turnover in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 38, 29-58. 
Kaplan, S. N. (1994). Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison 
of Japan and the United States. The Journal of Political Economy 102 (3), 510-
546, (qtd. 1994a). 
Kaplan, S. N. (1994). Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany. 
Journal of Law, Economics, Organization 10 (1), 142-159, (qtd. 1994b). 
Kato, T., Kubo, K. (2006). CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: 
Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay. Journal of the Japanese 
and International Economies 20, 1-19. 
Kato, T., Kim, W., Lee, J. H. (2007). Executive compensation, firm performance, and 
Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal 15, 36–55. 
Studies in the Meta-Analysis  
107 
Ke, B., Petroni, K., Safieddine, A. (1999). Ownership concentration and sensitivity of 
executive pay to accounting performance measures: Evidence from publicly and 
privately-held insurance companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28, 
185-209. 
Kim, Y. (1996). Long-Term Firm Performance and Chief Executive Turnover: An 
Empirical Study of the Dynamics. Journal of Law, Economics, Organization 12 
(2), 480-496. 
Lausten, M. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: 
empirical evidence on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 20, 391–414. 
Lavy, V. (2002). Evaluating the Effect of Teachers' Group Performance Incentives on 
Pupil Achievement. The Journal of Political Economy 110 (6), 1286-1317. 
Leonard, J. S. (1990). Executive Pay and Firm Performance. Industrial Labor 
Relations Review 43 (3), 13S-29S. 
Lewellen, W., Loderer, C., Martin, K., Blum, G. (1992). Executive Compensation and 
the Performance of the Firm. Managerial and Decision Economics 13 (1), 65-
74. 
Li, H., Zhou, L.-A. (2005). Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive 
role of personnel control in China. Journal of Public Economics 89, 1743– 1762. 
Main, B. G. (1991). Top Executive Pay and Performance. Managerial and Decision 
Economics 12 (3), 219-229. 
Maury, B. (2006). Corporate Performance, Corporate Governance and Top Executive 
Turnover in Finland. European Financial Management 12 (2), 221–248. 
Mayers, D., Smith Jr., C. W. (1992). Executive Compensation in the Life Insurance 
Industry. The Journal of Business 65 (1), 51-74. 
Studies in the Meta-Analysis  
108 
McNeil, C., Niehaus, G., Powers, E. (2004). Management turnover in subsidiaries of 
conglomerates versus stand-alone firms. Journal of Financial Economics 72 
(72), 63–96. 
Mehran, H. (1995). Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm 
performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38, 163-184. 
Mian, S. (2001). On the choice and replacement of chief financial officers. Journal of 
Financial Economics 60, 143-175. 
Mitsudome, T., Weintrop, J., Hwang, L.-S. (2008). The relation between changes in 
CEO compensation and firm performance: A Japanese/American comparison. 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22, 605–619. 
Muravyev, A. (2003). Turnover of Senior Managers in Russian Privatised Firms. 
Comparative Economic Studies 45 (2), 148–172. 
Parrino, R. (1997). CEO turnover and outside succession: A cross-sectional analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics 46, 165-197. 
Unite, A. A., Sullivan, M. J., Brookman, J., Majadillas, M. A., Taningco, A. (2008). 
Executive pay and firm performance in the Philippines. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal 16, 606-623. 
Zhou, X. (2000). CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from 
Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics 33 (1), 213-251. 
 
 
Appendices  
109 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendices  
110 
INDEX TO APPENDICES 
FIGURES 
Figure 30: Mean Number of Businesses by Industry ........................................... 115 
Figure 31: Mean Number of Businesses by Concentrated Industry .................... 115 
Figure 32: Mean Number of Businesses by Country ........................................... 116 
Figure 33: Mean Study Duration by Industry ....................................................... 116 
Figure 34: Mean Study Duration by Country ....................................................... 117 
Figure 35: Mean Study Duration by Continent .................................................... 117 
Figure 36: Mean Study Duration by Region ........................................................ 118 
Figure 37: Mean Number of Positive Incentives by Industry ............................... 118 
Figure 38: Mean Number of Positive Incentives by Country ................................ 119 
Figure 39: Mean Number of Positive Incentives by Continent ............................. 119 
Figure 40: Mean Number of Positive Incentives by Region ................................. 120 
Figure 41: Performance Measure/Incentives Frequencies .................................. 120 
Figure 42: Performance Measure/Effect Frequencies ......................................... 121 
Figure 43: Performance Measure/Type of Incentive/Effect Frequencies ............. 121 
Figure 44: Industry – Era ..................................................................................... 122 
Figure 45: Industry – Type of Incentive ............................................................... 122 
Figure 46: Industry – Effect ................................................................................. 123 
Figure 47: Concentrated Industry – Era .............................................................. 123 
Figure 48: Country – Era ..................................................................................... 124 
Figure 49: Continent – Era .................................................................................. 124 
Figure 50: Region – Era ...................................................................................... 125 
 
Appendices  
111 
 
TABLES 
Table 158: Descriptive Statistics .......................................................................... 126 
Table 159: Industry Frequencies .......................................................................... 126 
Table 160: Continent Frequencies ....................................................................... 126 
Table 161: Country Frequencies .......................................................................... 127 
Table 162: Date Statistics .................................................................................... 127 
Table 163: Beginning Date Frequencies .............................................................. 128 
Table 164: End Date Frequencies ........................................................................ 129 
Table 165: Source Frequencies ........................................................................... 129 
Table 166: Incentive Frequencies ........................................................................ 130 
Table 167: Number of Positive Incentives - Frequencies ..................................... 130 
Table 168: Decades ............................................................................................. 130 
Table 169: Types of Incentives ............................................................................ 130 
Table 170: Performance Measure Categories ..................................................... 131 
Table 171: Performance Measures ...................................................................... 131 
Table 172: Incentives/Effect ................................................................................. 131 
Table 173: Performance Measures/Incentives ..................................................... 132 
Table 174: Performance Measures/Effect ............................................................ 132 
Table 175: Performance Measures/Incentives/Effect ........................................... 132 
Table 176: Number of Businesses by Industry ..................................................... 133 
Table 177: Number of Businesses by Concentrated Industry .............................. 134 
Table 178: Number of Businesses by Country ..................................................... 135 
Table 179: Number of Businesses by Continent .................................................. 136 
Table 180: Number of Businesses by Region ...................................................... 137 
Table 181: Number of Businesses by Era ............................................................ 138 
Table 182: Study Duration by Industry ................................................................. 139 
Table 183: Study Duration by Concentrated Industry ........................................... 140 
Table 184: Study Duration by Country ................................................................. 141 
Table 185: Study Duration by Continent .............................................................. 142 
Table 186: Study Duration by Region .................................................................. 143 
Table 187: Study Duration by Era ........................................................................ 144 
Table 188: Number of Positive Incentives by Industry ......................................... 145 
Appendices  
112 
Table 189: Number of Positive Incentives by Concentrated Industry ................... 146 
Table 190: Number of Positive Incentives by Country .......................................... 147 
Table 191: Number of Positive Incentives by Continent ....................................... 148 
Table 192: Number of Positive Incentives by Region ........................................... 149 
Table 193: Number of Positive Incentives by Era................................................. 150 
Table 194: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 1950s............................................................................ 151 
Table 195: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 1960s............................................................................ 152 
Table 196: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 1970s............................................................................ 153 
Table 197: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 1980s............................................................................ 154 
Table 198: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 1990s............................................................................ 155 
Table 199: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 2000s............................................................................ 156 
Table 200: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Type of Incentive ............... 157 
Table 201: Crosstabulation Industry – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios .................... 157 
Table 202: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios
 ........................................................................................................... 158 
Table 203: Crosstabulation Industry – Market Ratios ........................................... 158 
Table 204: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Market Ratios .................... 159 
Table 205: Crosstabulation Industry – Revenue Ratios ....................................... 159 
Table 206: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Revenue Ratios ................. 160 
Table 207: Crosstabulation Industry – Other Ratios ............................................. 160 
Table 208: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Other Ratios ...................... 161 
Table 209: Crosstabulation Industry – Effect ....................................................... 161 
Table 210: Crosstabulation Country – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios .................... 162 
Table 211: Crosstabulation Country – Market Ratios ........................................... 163 
Table 212: Crosstabulation Country – Revenue Ratios ....................................... 164 
Table 213: Crosstabulation Country – Other Ratios ............................................. 165 
Table 214: Crosstabulation Continent – Market Ratios ........................................ 166 
Table 215: Crosstabulation Continent – Revenue Ratios ..................................... 166 
Appendices  
113 
Table 216: Crosstabulation Continent – Other Ratios .......................................... 166 
Table 217: Crosstabulation 1940s – Type of Incentive ........................................ 167 
Table 218: Crosstabulation 1950s – Type of Incentive ........................................ 167 
Table 219: Crosstabulation 1970s – Type of Incentive ........................................ 167 
Table 220: Crosstabulation 1980s – Type of Incentive ........................................ 167 
Table 221: Crosstabulation 1990s – Type of Incentive ........................................ 168 
Table 222: Crosstabulation 2000s – Type of Incentive ........................................ 168 
Table 223: 1940s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios................................................. 168 
Table 224: 1940s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios ............................... 168 
Table 225: 1940s – Market Ratios ....................................................................... 168 
Table 226: 1940s – Number of Market Ratios ...................................................... 169 
Table 227: 1940s – Revenue Ratios .................................................................... 169 
Table 228: 1940s – Number of Revenue Ratios .................................................. 169 
Table 229: 1940s – Other Ratios ......................................................................... 169 
Table 230: 1940s – Number of Other Ratios ........................................................ 169 
Table 231: 1950s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios................................................. 169 
Table 232: 1950s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios ............................... 170 
Table 233: 1950s – Market Ratios ....................................................................... 170 
Table 234: 1950s – Number of Market Ratios ...................................................... 170 
Table 235: 1950s – Revenue Ratios .................................................................... 170 
Table 236: 1950s – Number of Revenue Ratios .................................................. 170 
Table 237: 1950s – Other Ratios ......................................................................... 170 
Table 238: 1950s – Number of Other Ratios ........................................................ 171 
Table 239: 1960s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios................................................. 171 
Table 240: 1960s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios ............................... 171 
Table 241: 1960s – Market Ratios ....................................................................... 171 
Table 242: 1960s – Number of Market Ratios ...................................................... 171 
Table 243: 1960s – Revenue Ratios .................................................................... 171 
Table 244: 1960s – Number of Revenue Ratios .................................................. 172 
Table 245: 1960s – Other Ratios ......................................................................... 172 
Table 246: 1960s – Number of Other Ratios ........................................................ 172 
Table 247: 1970s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios................................................. 172 
Table 248: 1970s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios ............................... 172 
Table 249: 1970s – Market Ratios ....................................................................... 172 
Appendices  
114 
Table 250: 1970s – Number of Market Ratios ...................................................... 173 
Table 251: 1970s – Number of Revenue Ratios .................................................. 173 
Table 252: 1980s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios................................................. 173 
Table 253: 1980s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios ............................... 173 
Table 254: 1980s – Number of Market Ratios ...................................................... 173 
Table 255: 1980s – Revenue Ratios .................................................................... 173 
Table 256: 1980s – Number of Revenue Ratios .................................................. 174 
Table 257: 1980s – Other Ratios ......................................................................... 174 
Table 258: 1980s – Number of Other Ratios ........................................................ 174 
Table 259: 1990s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios................................................. 174 
Table 260: 1990s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios ............................... 174 
Table 261: 1990s – Market Ratios ....................................................................... 174 
Table 262: 1990s – Number of Market Ratios ...................................................... 175 
Table 263: 1990s – Revenue Ratios .................................................................... 175 
Table 264: 1990s – Number of Revenue Ratios .................................................. 175 
Table 265: 2000s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios................................................. 175 
Table 266: 2000s – Market Ratios ....................................................................... 175 
Table 267: 2000s – Number of Market Ratios ...................................................... 175 
Table 268: 2000s – Revenue Ratios .................................................................... 176 
Table 269: 2000s – Number of Revenue Ratios .................................................. 176 
Table 270: 2000s – Other Ratios ......................................................................... 176 
Table 271: 2000s – Number of Other Ratios ........................................................ 176 
Table 272: Crosstabulation 1940s – Effect .......................................................... 176 
Table 273: Crosstabulation 1950s – Effect .......................................................... 177 
Table 274: Crosstabulation 1960s – Effect .......................................................... 177 
Table 275: Crosstabulation 1970s – Effect .......................................................... 177 
Table 276: Crosstabulation 1980s – Effect .......................................................... 177 
Table 277: Crosstabulation 1990s – Effect .......................................................... 178 
Table 278: Crosstabulation 2000s – Effect .......................................................... 178 
 
Appendices  
115 
Figure 30: Mean Number of Businesses by Industry 
 
 
Figure 31: Mean Number of Businesses by Concentrated Industry 
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Figure 32: Mean Number of Businesses by Country 
 
 
Figure 33: Mean Study Duration by Industry 
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Figure 34: Mean Study Duration by Country 
 
 
Figure 35: Mean Study Duration by Continent 
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Figure 36: Mean Study Duration by Region 
 
 
Figure 37: Mean Number of Positive Incentives by Industry 
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Figure 38: Mean Number of Positive Incentives by Country 
 
 
Figure 39: Mean Number of Positive Incentives by Continent 
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Figure 40: Mean Number of Positive Incentives by Region 
 
 
Figure 41: Performance Measure/Incentives Frequencies 
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Figure 42: Performance Measure/Effect Frequencies 
28,4%
23,9%
21,3%
12,9%
4,5% 3,9% 3,2%
1,9%
0,0%
5,0%
10,0%
15,0%
20,0%
25,0%
30,0%
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
Performance Measure/Effect
 
 
Figure 43: Performance Measure/Type of Incentive/Effect Frequencies 
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Figure 44: Industry – Era 
 
 
Figure 45: Industry – Type of Incentive 
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Figure 46: Industry – Effect 
 
 
Figure 47: Concentrated Industry – Era 
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Figure 48: Country – Era 
 
 
Figure 49: Continent – Era 
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Figure 50: Region – Era 
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Table 158: Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Sum Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Variance
number of businesses 1 9500 40037 588,78 1224,674 1499827,518
study duration (years) 1 43 581 8,5478 7,86321 61,830
number of positive incentives 0 5 129 1,90 1,780 3,168
number of EPR 0 3 53 ,78 ,789 ,622
number of MR 0 4 68 1,00 1,022 1,045
number of RR 0 6 127 1,87 1,515 2,296
number of OR 0 2 24 ,35 ,512 ,262
 
 
Table 159: Industry Frequencies 
 Industry Frequency Percent
not specified 50 73,5
insurance 4 5,9
manufacturing 3 4,4
schools 3 4,4
banking 2 2,9
basketball 1 1,5
charitable 1 1,5
hospitals 1 1,5
provincial leaders 1 1,5
soccer 1 1,5
utility 1 1,5
Total 68 100,0
 
 
 
Table 160: Continent Frequencies 
Continent Frequency Percent
America 30 44,1
Europe 22 32,4
Asia 12 17,6
not specified 3 4,4
Eurasia 1 1,5
Total 68 100,0
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Table 161: Country Frequencies 
Country Frequency Percent
US 29 42,6
UK 9 13,2
Japan 6 8,8
Czech Republic 4 5,9
China 3 4,4
not specified 2 2,9
Denmark 2 2,9
Bulgaria 1 1,5
Canada 1 1,5
Finland 1 1,5
Germany 1 1,5
Israel 1 1,5
Italy 1 1,5
Korea 1 1,5
Norway 1 1,5
Philippines 1 1,5
Russia 1 1,5
Slovak Republic 1 1,5
UK and US 1 1,5
Ukraine 1 1,5
Total 68 100,0
 
 
Table 162: Date Statistics 
 beginning date end date
N Valid 68 68
Missing 0 0
Mean 38,99
a
46,62
b
Mode 46
c
48
d
Std. Deviation 10,718 6,428
Variance 114,880 41,314
Minimum 1
e
24
f
Maximum 55
g
59
h
a. 1986
b. 1994
c. 1993
d. 1995
e. 1948
f. 1971
g. 2002
h. 2006
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Table 163: Beginning Date Frequencies 
 Beginning Date Frequency Percent
1993 7 10,3
1981 6 8,8
1998 5 7,4
1974 4 5,9
1994 4 5,9
1997 4 5,9
1971 3 4,4
1980 3 4,4
1984 3 4,4
1985 3 4,4
1986 3 4,4
1979 2 2,9
1982 2 2,9
1988 2 2,9
1991 2 2,9
1992 2 2,9
1996 2 2,9
1948 1 1,5
1959 1 1,5
1964 1 1,5
1969 1 1,5
1972 1 1,5
1987 1 1,5
1989 1 1,5
1995 1 1,5
2000 1 1,5
2001 1 1,5
2002 1 1,5
Total 68 100,0
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Table 164: End Date Frequencies 
 End Date Frequency Percent
1995 8 11,8
1997 8 11,8
2000 6 8,8
1989 5 7,4
1988 4 5,9
1996 4 5,9
1998 4 5,9
1986 3 4,4
1990 3 4,4
1992 3 4,4
2002 3 4,4
1987 2 2,9
1991 2 2,9
1993 2 2,9
1994 2 2,9
1999 2 2,9
1971 1 1,5
1973 1 1,5
1980 1 1,5
1985 1 1,5
2001 1 1,5
2003 1 1,5
2006 1 1,5
Total 68 100,0
 
 
 
Table 165: Source Frequencies 
 Sources Frequency Percent
company financial statements 57 83,8
pre-tax accounting profits 3 4,4
scholastic achievement criteria 3 4,4
survey data 3 4,4
winning percentages 2 2,9
Total 68 100,0
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Table 166: Incentive Frequencies 
Type of Incentive Frequency Percent
positive 32 47,1
negative 23 33,8
both 13 19,1
Total 68 100,0
 
 
Table 167: Number of Positive Incentives - Frequencies 
 Number of Positive Incentives Frequency Percent
 0 23 33,8
3 14 20,6
1 11 16,2
5 8 11,8
2 6 8,8
4 6 8,8
Total 68 100,0
 
 
Table 168: Decades 
Decade Sum Percent
1990s 47 40,5%
1980s 36 31,0%
1970s 14 12,1%
2000s 12 10,3%
1960s 4 3,4%
1950s 2 1,7%
1940s 1 0,9%
 
 
Table 169: Types of Incentives 
Incentives Sum Percent
total pay 38 23,0%
bonus 37 22,4%
turnover 36 21,8%
salary 31 18,8%
benefits 12 7,3%
long-term incentive pay 11 6,7%
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Table 170: Performance Measure Categories 
Performance Measure Categories Sum Percent
revenue ratios 51 32,9%
market ratios 42 27,1%
efficiency/profitability ratios 39 25,2%
other ratios 23 14,8%
 
 
Table 171: Performance Measures 
Performance Measures Sum Percent
size (assets) 34 12,5%
ROStock 33 12,1%
ROAssets 31 11,4%
sales 30 11,0%
sales change 18 6,6%
employment 16 5,9%
earnings before interest and taxes 15 5,5%
share price 13 4,8%
earnings after interest and taxes 11 4,0%
operating income 11 4,0%
shareholder wealth 10 3,7%
market value (equity) 9 3,3%
ROEquity 8 2,9%
operating income change 6 2,2%
ROAssets change 6 2,2%
labor productivity 5 1,8%
ROSales 3 1,1%
student achievement 3 1,1%
employment change 2 0,7%
Tobin's Q 2 0,7%
winning (sports) 2 0,7%
gross domestic product 1 0,4%
program activities 1 0,4%
size change 1 0,4%
Tobin's Q change 1 0,4%
 
 
Table 172: Incentives/Effect 
Incentives/Effect Sum Percent
positive incentives/positive effect 25 36,8%
negative incentives/positive effect 23 33,8%
both incentives/positive effect 12 17,6%
positive incentivesc/no effect 7 10,3%
both incentives/no effect 1 1,5%
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Table 173: Performance Measures/Incentives 
Performance Measures/Incentives Sum Percent
RR/positive incentives 28 18,7%
EPR/positive incentives 20 13,3%
MR/positive incentives 22 14,7%
RR/negative incentives 17 11,3%
EPR/negative incentives 14 9,3%
MR/negative incentives 12 8,0%
OR/positive incentives 9 6,0%
OR/negative incentives 9 6,0%
MR/both incentives 6 4,0%
EPR/both incentives 5 3,3%
RR/both incentives 5 3,3%
OR/both incentives 3 2,0%
 
 
Table 174: Performance Measures/Effect 
Performance Measures/Effect Sum Percent
RR/positive effect 44 28,4%
MR/positive effect 37 23,9%
EPR/positive effect 33 21,3%
OR/positive effect 20 12,9%
RR/no effect 7 4,5%
EPR/no effect 6 3,9%
MR/no effect 5 3,2%
OR/no effect 3 1,9%
 
 
Table 175: Performance Measures/Incentives/Effect 
Performance Measures/Incentives/Effect Sum Percent
RR/positive incentives/positive effect 21 14,0%
MR/positive incentives/positive effect 17 11,3%
RR/negative incentives/positive effect 17 11,3%
EPR/positive incentives/positive effect 14 9,3%
EPR/negative incentives/positive effect 14 9,3%
MR/negative incentives/positive effect 12 8,0%
OR/negative incentives/positive effect 9 6,0%
OR/positive incentives/positive effect 7 4,7%
RR/positive incentives/no effect 7 4,7%
EPR/positive incentives/no effect 6 4,0%
MR/both incentives/positive effect 6 4,0%
EPR/both incentives/positive effect 5 3,3%
MR/positive incentives/no effect 5 3,3%
RR/both incentivesc/positive effect 4 2,7%
OR/both incentives/positive effect 3 2,0%
OR/positive incentives/no effect 2 1,3%
RR/both incentives/no effect 1 0,7%
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Table 176: Number of Businesses by Industry 
Statistic Std. Error
695,98 195,659
Lower Bound 302,79
Upper Bound 1089,17
482,86
271,50
1914115,571
1383,516
16
9500
9484
786
5,522 ,337
34,749 ,662
115,00 32,000
Lower Bound -291,60
Upper Bound 521,60
.
115,00
2048,000
45,255
83
147
64
.
. .
. .
27,75 6,047
Lower Bound 8,51
Upper Bound 46,99
27,33
24,00
146,250
12,093
18
45
27
22
1,469 1,014
2,031 2,619
208,33 116,494
Lower Bound -292,90
Upper Bound 709,57
.
153,00
40712,333
201,773
40
432
392
.
1,141 1,225
. .
188,33 157,819
Lower Bound -490,71
Upper Bound 867,37
.
62,00
74720,333
273,350
1
502
501
.
1,636 1,225
. .
Kurtosis
Industry
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
insurance Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
banking Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
schools Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
manufacturing Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
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Table 177: Number of Businesses by Concentrated Industry 
Statistic Std. Error
695,98 195,659
Lower Bound 302,79
Upper Bound 1089,17
482,86
271,50
1914115,571
1383,516
16
9500
9484
786
5,522 ,337
34,749 ,662
509,67 334,743
Lower Bound -350,82
Upper Bound 1370,15
447,69
196,50
672317,867
819,950
1
2134
2133
889
2,148 ,845
4,782 1,741
208,33 116,494
Lower Bound -292,90
Upper Bound 709,57
.
153,00
40712,333
201,773
40
432
392
.
1,141 1,225
. .
56,83 20,524
Lower Bound 4,08
Upper Bound 109,59
53,98
36,00
2527,367
50,273
18
147
129
79
1,460 ,845
1,564 1,741
532,50 385,500
Lower Bound -4365,74
Upper Bound 5430,74
.
532,50
297220,500
545,179
147
918
771
.
. .
. .
Kurtosis
Industry Concentrated
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
commercial Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
charitable/education/
health/public
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
sports Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
financial Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
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Table 178: Number of Businesses by Country 
Statistic Std. Error
551,00 426,000
Lower Bound -4861,84
Upper Bound 5963,84
.
551,00
362952,000
602,455
125
977
852
.
. .
. .
336,33 157,823
Lower Bound -342,72
Upper Bound 1015,39
.
432,00
74724,333
273,358
28
549
521
.
-1,382 1,225
. .
846,25 50,513
Lower Bound 685,50
Upper Bound 1007,00
849,78
878,00
10206,250
101,026
706
923
217
182
-1,263 1,014
,793 2,619
4871,50 4628,500
Lower Bound -53939,17
Upper Bound 63682,17
.
4871,50
42846024,500
6545,687
243
9500
9257
.
. .
. .
421,50 160,052
Lower Bound 10,07
Upper Bound 832,93
403,72
317,00
153699,500
392,045
51
1112
1061
636
1,265 ,845
1,348 1,741
446,89 169,506
Lower Bound 56,01
Upper Bound 837,77
405,43
241,00
258590,111
508,518
40
1600
1560
586
1,797 ,717
2,941 1,400
481,17 132,790
Lower Bound 209,16
Upper Bound 753,18
404,01
149,00
511364,433
715,097
1
2399
2398
441
1,846 ,434
2,219 ,845
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
US Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
UK Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Japan Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Denmark Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Czech 
Republic
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
China Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Country
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
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Table 179: Number of Businesses by Continent 
Statistic Std. Error
400,67 288,257
Lower Bound -839,60
Upper Bound 1640,94
.
125,00
249276,333
499,276
100
977
877
.
1,727 1,225
. .
490,30 128,612
Lower Bound 227,26
Upper Bound 753,34
414,35
151,00
496230,562
704,436
1
2399
2398
524
1,821 ,427
2,222 ,833
343,25 89,117
Lower Bound 147,10
Upper Bound 539,40
318,06
271,50
95302,023
308,710
28
1112
1084
444
1,453 ,637
2,603 1,232
889,55 419,795
Lower Bound 16,53
Upper Bound 1762,56
498,27
243,00
3877009,498
1969,012
40
9500
9460
781
4,348 ,491
19,723 ,953
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Europe Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Asia Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
America Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Continent
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
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Table 180: Number of Businesses by Region 
Statistic Std. Error
400,67 288,257
Lower Bound -839,60
Upper Bound 1640,94
.
125,00
249276,333
499,276
100
977
877
.
1,727 1,225
. .
490,30 128,612
Lower Bound 227,26
Upper Bound 753,34
414,35
151,00
496230,562
704,436
1
2399
2398
524
1,821 ,427
2,222 ,833
343,25 89,117
Lower Bound 147,10
Upper Bound 539,40
318,06
271,50
95302,023
308,710
28
1112
1084
444
1,453 ,637
2,603 1,232
731,63 95,987
Lower Bound 504,65
Upper Bound 958,60
750,36
875,50
73707,411
271,491
203
923
720
413
-1,395 ,752
,811 1,481
943,60 620,532
Lower Bound -387,31
Upper Bound 2274,51
518,44
213,00
5775907,543
2403,312
40
9500
9460
415
3,687 ,580
13,902 1,121
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Western 
Europe
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Eastern 
Europe
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Asia Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
America Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Region
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
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Table 181: Number of Businesses by Era 
Statistic Std. Error
341,27 75,659
Lower Bound 186,53
Upper Bound 496,01
298,35
148,00
171728,064
414,401
16
1600
1584
396
1,613 ,427
1,823 ,833
784,18 256,105
Lower Bound 265,27
Upper Bound 1303,10
529,90
302,00
2492418,857
1578,740
1
9500
9499
752
4,834 ,383
26,367 ,750
Kurtosis
Era
pre 1990 Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
post 1990 Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
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Table 182: Study Duration by Industry 
Statistic Std. Error
8,4250 1,13137
Lower Bound 6,1514
Upper Bound 10,6986
7,2389
6,0000
64,000
7,99999
1,00
43,00
42,00
5,25
2,848 ,337
9,237 ,662
8,0000 2,00000
Lower Bound -17,4124
Upper Bound 33,4124
.
8,0000
8,000
2,82843
6,00
10,00
4,00
.
. .
. .
9,0000 3,46410
Lower Bound -2,0243
Upper Bound 20,0243
9,0000
9,0000
48,000
6,92820
3,00
15,00
12,00
12,00
,000 1,014
-6,000 2,619
5,3333 1,76383
Lower Bound -2,2558
Upper Bound 12,9225
.
6,0000
9,333
3,05505
2,00
8,00
6,00
.
-,935 1,225
. .
3,0000 1,15470
Lower Bound -1,9683
Upper Bound 7,9683
.
3,0000
4,000
2,00000
1,00
5,00
4,00
.
,000 1,225
. .
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
schools Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
manufacturing Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
insurance Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
banking Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Industry
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
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Table 183: Study Duration by Concentrated Industry 
Statistic Std. Error
8,4250 1,13137
Lower Bound 6,1514
Upper Bound 10,6986
7,2389
6,0000
64,000
7,99999
1,00
43,00
42,00
5,25
2,848 ,337
9,237 ,662
5,5000 2,39096
Lower Bound -,6461
Upper Bound 11,6461
5,1111
4,0000
34,300
5,85662
1,00
17,00
16,00
6,25
2,047 ,845
4,513 1,741
5,3333 1,76383
Lower Bound -2,2558
Upper Bound 12,9225
.
6,0000
9,333
3,05505
2,00
8,00
6,00
.
-,935 1,225
. .
8,6667 2,26078
Lower Bound 2,8552
Upper Bound 14,4782
8,6296
8,0000
30,667
5,53775
3,00
15,00
12,00
12,00
,225 ,845
-2,280 1,741
17,0000 9,00000
Lower Bound -97,3558
Upper Bound 131,3558
.
17,0000
162,000
12,72792
8,00
26,00
18,00
.
. .
. .
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
sports Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
financial Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
commercial Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
charitable/education/
health/public
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Industry Concentrated
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
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Table 184: Study Duration by Country 
Statistic Std. Error
14,5000 4,50000
Lower Bound -42,6779
Upper Bound 71,6779
.
14,5000
40,500
6,36396
10,00
19,00
9,00
.
. .
. .
8,6667 4,25572
Lower Bound -9,6442
Upper Bound 26,9775
.
6,0000
54,333
7,37111
3,00
17,00
14,00
.
1,415 1,225
. .
5,2500 ,47871
Lower Bound 3,7265
Upper Bound 6,7735
5,2778
5,5000
,917
,95743
4,00
6,00
2,00
1,75
-,855 1,014
-1,289 2,619
3,5000 ,50000
Lower Bound -2,8531
Upper Bound 9,8531
.
3,5000
,500
,70711
3,00
4,00
1,00
.
. .
. .
10,0000 1,82574
Lower Bound 5,3068
Upper Bound 14,6932
9,8889
9,5000
20,000
4,47214
5,00
17,00
12,00
8,25
,604 ,845
-,363 1,741
7,2315 2,50839
Lower Bound 1,4471
Upper Bound 13,0158
6,5350
6,0000
56,628
7,52516
1,00
26,00
25,00
6,00
2,309 ,717
6,018 1,400
10,5201 1,90092
Lower Bound 6,6263
Upper Bound 14,4140
9,3480
7,0000
104,791
10,23677
1,00
43,00
42,00
8,96
1,930 ,434
3,640 ,845
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
US Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
UK Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Japan Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Denmark Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Czech 
Republic
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
China Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Country
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
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Table 185: Study Duration by Continent 
Statistic Std. Error
11,0278 4,33663
Lower Bound -7,6312
Upper Bound 29,6868
.
10,0000
56,419
7,51126
4,08
19,00
14,92
.
,604 1,225
. .
10,3361 1,84566
Lower Bound 6,5613
Upper Bound 14,1109
9,1512
6,5000
102,194
10,10909
1,00
43,00
42,00
8,48
1,983 ,427
3,874 ,833
8,0000 1,50756
Lower Bound 4,6819
Upper Bound 11,3181
7,7778
6,0000
27,273
5,22233
3,00
17,00
14,00
9,00
,850 ,637
-,642 1,232
6,1856 1,05981
Lower Bound 3,9816
Upper Bound 8,3896
5,4537
5,0000
24,710
4,97094
1,00
26,00
25,00
4,00
3,205 ,491
12,690 ,953
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Europe Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Asia Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
America Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Continent
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
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Table 186: Study Duration by Region 
Statistic Std. Error
11,0278 4,33663
Lower Bound -7,6312
Upper Bound 29,6868
.
10,0000
56,419
7,51126
4,08
19,00
14,92
.
,604 1,225
. .
10,3361 1,84566
Lower Bound 6,5613
Upper Bound 14,1109
9,1512
6,5000
102,194
10,10909
1,00
43,00
42,00
8,48
1,983 ,427
3,874 ,833
8,0000 1,50756
Lower Bound 4,6819
Upper Bound 11,3181
7,7778
6,0000
27,273
5,22233
3,00
17,00
14,00
9,00
,850 ,637
-,642 1,232
5,0000 ,32733
Lower Bound 4,2260
Upper Bound 5,7740
5,0000
5,0000
,857
,92582
4,00
6,00
2,00
2,00
,000 ,752
-2,100 1,481
6,8056 1,53676
Lower Bound 3,5095
Upper Bound 10,1016
6,0617
6,0000
35,424
5,95183
1,00
26,00
25,00
6,00
2,590 ,580
8,322 1,121
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Western 
Europe
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Eastern 
Europe
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Asia Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
America Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Region
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
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Table 187: Study Duration by Era 
Statistic Std. Error
12,9667 1,79494
Lower Bound 9,2956
Upper Bound 16,6377
12,0185
9,5000
96,654
9,83128
2,00
43,00
41,00
11,00
1,579 ,427
2,464 ,833
5,0592 ,45524
Lower Bound 4,1368
Upper Bound 5,9816
4,8406
4,5417
7,875
2,80630
1,00
14,00
13,00
3,00
1,331 ,383
2,322 ,750
post 1990 Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Era
pre 1990 Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
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Table 188: Number of Positive Incentives by Industry 
Statistic Std. Error
1,98 ,269
Lower Bound 1,44
Upper Bound 2,52
1,92
1,50
3,612
1,900
0
5
5
3
,364 ,337
-1,379 ,662
2,50 ,500
Lower Bound -3,85
Upper Bound 8,85
.
2,50
,500
,707
2
3
1
.
. .
. .
3,50 ,289
Lower Bound 2,58
Upper Bound 4,42
3,50
3,50
,333
,577
3
4
1
1
,000 1,014
-6,000 2,619
1,67 ,882
Lower Bound -2,13
Upper Bound 5,46
.
2,00
2,333
1,528
0
3
3
.
-,935 1,225
. .
Kurtosis
Industry
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
insurance Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
banking Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
manufacturing Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
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Table 189: Number of Positive Incentives by Concentrated Industry 
Statistic Std. Error
1,98 ,269
Lower Bound 1,44
Upper Bound 2,52
1,92
1,50
3,612
1,900
0
5
5
3
,364 ,337
-1,379 ,662
1,00 ,258
Lower Bound ,34
Upper Bound 1,66
1,00
1,00
,400
,632
0
2
2
1
,000 ,845
2,500 1,741
1,67 ,882
Lower Bound -2,13
Upper Bound 5,46
.
2,00
2,333
1,528
0
3
3
.
-,935 1,225
. .
3,17 ,307
Lower Bound 2,38
Upper Bound 3,96
3,19
3,00
,567
,753
2
4
2
1
-,313 ,845
-,104 1,741
Kurtosis
Industry Concentrated
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
commercial Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
charitable/education/
health/public
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
financial Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
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Table 190: Number of Positive Incentives by Country 
Statistic Std. Error
1,00 1,000
Lower Bound -11,71
Upper Bound 13,71
.
1,00
2,000
1,414
0
2
2
.
. .
. .
,33 ,333
Lower Bound -1,10
Upper Bound 1,77
.
,00
,333
,577
0
1
1
.
1,732 1,225
. .
,75 ,750
Lower Bound -1,64
Upper Bound 3,14
,67
,00
2,250
1,500
0
3
3
2
2,000 1,014
4,000 2,619
2,17 ,703
Lower Bound ,36
Upper Bound 3,97
2,19
3,00
2,967
1,722
0
4
4
3
-,731 ,845
-1,731 1,741
2,33 ,667
Lower Bound ,80
Upper Bound 3,87
2,31
2,00
4,000
2,000
0
5
5
4
,254 ,717
-1,647 1,400
2,31 ,330
Lower Bound 1,64
Upper Bound 2,99
2,29
3,00
3,150
1,775
0
5
5
4
,028 ,434
-1,322 ,845
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
US Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
UK Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Japan Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Czech 
Republic
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
China Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Country
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
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Table 191: Number of Positive Incentives by Continent 
Statistic Std. Error
2,33 1,453
Lower Bound -3,92
Upper Bound 8,58
.
2,00
6,333
2,517
0
5
5
.
,586 1,225
. .
2,40 ,331
Lower Bound 1,72
Upper Bound 3,08
2,39
3,00
3,283
1,812
0
5
5
3
-,013 ,427
-1,356 ,833
1,67 ,432
Lower Bound ,72
Upper Bound 2,62
1,63
1,50
2,242
1,497
0
4
4
3
,101 ,637
-1,728 1,232
1,36 ,364
Lower Bound ,61
Upper Bound 2,12
1,24
1,00
2,909
1,706
0
5
5
3
1,080 ,491
-,077 ,953
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Europe Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Asia Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
America Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Continent
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
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Table 192: Number of Positive Incentives by Region 
Statistic Std. Error
2,33 1,453
Lower Bound -3,92
Upper Bound 8,58
.
2,00
6,333
2,517
0
5
5
.
,586 1,225
. .
2,40 ,331
Lower Bound 1,72
Upper Bound 3,08
2,39
3,00
3,283
1,812
0
5
5
3
-,013 ,427
-1,356 ,833
1,67 ,432
Lower Bound ,72
Upper Bound 2,62
1,63
1,50
2,242
1,497
0
4
4
3
,101 ,637
-1,728 1,232
,88 ,479
Lower Bound -,26
Upper Bound 2,01
,81
,00
1,839
1,356
0
3
3
3
1,210 ,752
-,470 1,481
1,53 ,477
Lower Bound ,51
Upper Bound 2,56
1,43
1,00
3,410
1,846
0
5
5
3
1,039 ,580
-,328 1,121
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Western 
Europe
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Eastern 
Europe
Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Asia Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
America Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Kurtosis
Region
not specified Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
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Table 193: Number of Positive Incentives by Era 
Statistic Std. Error
1,90 ,323
Lower Bound 1,24
Upper Bound 2,56
1,83
2,00
3,128
1,768
0
5
5
3
,242 ,427
-1,446 ,833
1,89 ,294
Lower Bound 1,30
Upper Bound 2,49
1,83
1,00
3,286
1,813
0
5
5
3
,539 ,383
-1,054 ,750
Era
pre 1990 Mean
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Kurtosis
post 1990 Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
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Table 194: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 1950s 
Statistic Std. Error
23,00 7,000
Lower Bound -65,94
Upper Bound 111,94
.
23,00
98,000
9,899
16
30
14
.
. .
. .
40,0000 3,00000
Lower Bound 1,8814
Upper Bound 78,1186
.
40,0000
18,000
4,24264
37,00
43,00
6,00
.
. .
. .
4,50 ,500
Lower Bound -1,85
Upper Bound 10,85
.
4,50
,500
,707
4
5
1
.
. .
. .
Skewness
Kurtosis
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
# positive incentives Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
study duration Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
1950s
#businesses Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
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Table 195: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 1960s 
Statistic Std. Error
423,75 392,142
Lower Bound -824,22
Upper Bound 1671,72
381,06
39,50
615100,250
784,283
16
1600
1584
1193
1,998 1,014
3,994 2,619
23,2500 9,85203
Lower Bound -8,1036
Upper Bound 54,6036
23,2778
23,5000
388,250
19,70406
3,00
43,00
40,00
36,75
-,028 1,014
-4,945 2,619
3,75 ,946
Lower Bound ,74
Upper Bound 6,76
3,83
4,50
3,583
1,893
1
5
4
3
-1,659 1,014
2,615 2,619
Skewness
Kurtosis
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
# positive incentives Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
study duration Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
1960s
#businesses Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
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Table 196: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 1970s 
Statistic Std. Error
457,86 146,186
Lower Bound 142,04
Upper Bound 773,67
418,95
151,00
299185,824
546,979
16
1600
1584
967
,918 ,597
-,631 1,154
19,0714 3,07679
Lower Bound 12,4244
Upper Bound 25,7184
18,6905
17,0000
132,533
11,51230
2,00
43,00
41,00
13,00
,586 ,597
,314 1,154
1,86 ,553
Lower Bound ,66
Upper Bound 3,05
1,79
1,00
4,286
2,070
0
5
5
4
,525 ,597
-1,637 1,154
Skewness
Kurtosis
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
# positive incentives Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
study duration Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
1970s
#businesses Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
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Table 197: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 1980s 
Statistic Std. Error
333,53 75,058
Lower Bound 181,15
Upper Bound 485,90
273,38
168,50
202810,713
450,345
16
2227
2211
265
2,635 ,393
8,246 ,768
12,3889 1,51777
Lower Bound 9,3077
Upper Bound 15,4701
11,4136
9,0000
82,930
9,10660
2,00
43,00
41,00
9,00
1,807 ,393
3,520 ,768
1,72 ,278
Lower Bound 1,16
Upper Bound 2,29
1,66
1,50
2,778
1,667
0
5
5
3
,312 ,393
-1,430 ,768
Skewness
Kurtosis
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
# positive incentives Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
study duration Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
1980s
#businesses Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
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Table 198: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 1990s 
Statistic Std. Error
672,09 210,302
Lower Bound 248,77
Upper Bound 1095,40
446,48
243,00
2078664,993
1441,758
1
9500
9499
660
5,275 ,347
31,743 ,681
8,8989 1,30147
Lower Bound 6,2792
Upper Bound 11,5187
7,7175
6,0000
79,610
8,92242
1,00
43,00
42,00
6,00
2,320 ,347
5,504 ,681
1,83 ,273
Lower Bound 1,28
Upper Bound 2,38
1,76
1,00
3,492
1,869
0
5
5
3
,530 ,347
-1,188 ,681
# positive incentives Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
study duration Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Interquartile Range
1990s
#businesses Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Skewness
Kurtosis
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
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Table 199: Mean Number of Businesses, Study Duration, and Number of Positive 
Incentives by 2000s 
Statistic Std. Error
418,25 95,029
Lower Bound 209,09
Upper Bound 627,41
412,33
355,00
108366,023
329,190
27
916
889
655
,487 ,637
-1,252 1,232
4,1875 ,48927
Lower Bound 3,1106
Upper Bound 5,2644
4,1528
4,0417
2,873
1,69488
1,00
8,00
7,00
1,52
,586 ,637
2,263 1,232
2,33 ,569
Lower Bound 1,08
Upper Bound 3,58
2,31
2,50
3,879
1,969
0
5
5
4
,213 ,637
-1,441 1,232
Skewness
Kurtosis
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
# positive incentives Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
study duration Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
2000s
#businesses Mean
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
 
Appendices  
157 
Table 200: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
23 18 9 50
46,0% 36,0% 18,0% 100,0%
3 1 2 6
50,0% 16,7% 33,3% 100,0%
1 1 1 3
33,3% 33,3% 33,3% 100,0%
5 0 1 6
83,3% 0,0% 16,7% 100,0%
0 2 0 2
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 0 1
0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
utility
Total
 
type of incentive
Total
industry 
concentrated
not specified
charitable/educati
on/health/public
commercial
financial
sports
 
 
Table 201: Crosstabulation Industry – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
non-existent existent
16 34 50
32,0% 68,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
2 2 4
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
3 0 3
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
29 39 68
42,6% 57,4% 100,0%
Total
insurance
manufacturing
provincial leaders
schools
soccer
utility
 
efficiency/profitability ratios
Total
industry
not specified
banking
basketball
charitable
hospitals
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Table 202: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
non-existent existent
16 34 50
32,0% 68,0% 100,0%
5 1 6
83,3% 16,7% 100,0%
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
4 2 6
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
29 39 68
42,6% 57,4% 100,0%
utility
Total
 
efficiency/profitability ratios
Total
industry 
concentrated
not specified
charitable/educati
on/health/public
commercial
financial
sports
 
 
Table 203: Crosstabulation Industry – Market Ratios 
non-existent existent
12 38 50
24,0% 76,0% 100,0%
0 2 2
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
4 0 4
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
3 0 3
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
26 42 68
38,2% 61,8% 100,0%
Total
insurance
manufacturing
provincial leaders
schools
soccer
utility
 
market ratios
Total
industry
not specified
banking
basketball
charitable
hospitals
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Table 204: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Market Ratios 
non-existent existent
12 38 50
24,0% 76,0% 100,0%
6 0 6
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
4 2 6
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
26 42 68
38,2% 61,8% 100,0%
utility
Total
 
market ratios
Total
industry 
concentrated
not specified
charitable/educati
on/health/public
commercial
financial
sports
 
 
Table 205: Crosstabulation Industry – Revenue Ratios 
non-existent existent
8 42 50
16,0% 84,0% 100,0%
0 2 2
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 4 4
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
3 0 3
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
17 51 68
25,0% 75,0% 100,0%
 
revenue ratios
Total
industry
not specified
banking
basketball
charitable
hospitals
Total
insurance
manufacturing
provincial leaders
schools
soccer
utility
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Table 206: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Revenue Ratios 
non-existent existent
8 42 50
16,0% 84,0% 100,0%
4 2 6
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
0 6 6
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
17 51 68
25,0% 75,0% 100,0%
utility
Total
 
revenue ratios
Total
industry 
concentrated
not specified
charitable/educati
on/health/public
commercial
financial
sports
 
 
Table 207: Crosstabulation Industry – Other Ratios 
non-existent existent
35 15 50
70,0% 30,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
4 0 4
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 2 3
33,3% 66,7% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 3 3
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
45 23 68
66,2% 33,8% 100,0%
 
other ratios
Total
industry
not specified
banking
basketball
charitable
hospitals
Total
insurance
manufacturing
provincial leaders
schools
soccer
utility
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Table 208: Crosstabulation Concentrated Industry – Other Ratios 
non-existent existent
35 15 50
70,0% 30,0% 100,0%
2 4 6
33,3% 66,7% 100,0%
1 2 3
33,3% 66,7% 100,0%
6 0 6
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 2 2
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
45 23 68
66,2% 33,8% 100,0%
utility
Total
 
other ratios
Total
industry 
concentrated
not specified
charitable/educati
on/health/public
commercial
financial
sports
 
 
Table 209: Crosstabulation Industry – Effect 
positive effect no effect
44 6 50
88,0% 12,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
2 2 4
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
3 0 3
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
3 0 3
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
insurance
manufacturing
provincial leaders
schools
soccer
utility
 
effect
Total
industry
not specified
banking
basketball
charitable
hospitals
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Table 210: Crosstabulation Country – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
non-existent existent
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
0 4 4
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 5 6
16,7% 83,3% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
5 4 9
55,6% 44,4% 100,0%
14 15 29
48,3% 51,7% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
29 39 68
42,6% 57,4% 100,0%
Japan
 
efficiency/profitability ratios
Total
country
not specified
Bulgaria
Canada
China
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Israel
Italy
UK
US
Ukraine
Total
Korea
Norway
Philippines
Russia
Slovak Republic
UK and US
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Table 211: Crosstabulation Country – Market Ratios 
non-existent existent
0 2 2
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
4 0 4
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 6 6
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
3 6 9
33,3% 66,7% 100,0%
10 19 29
34,5% 65,5% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
26 42 68
38,2% 61,8% 100,0%
Japan
 
market ratios
Total
country
not specified
Bulgaria
Canada
China
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Israel
Italy
UK
US
Ukraine
Total
Korea
Norway
Philippines
Russia
Slovak Republic
UK and US
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Table 212: Crosstabulation Country – Revenue Ratios 
non-existent existent
0 2 2
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 2 3
33,3% 66,7% 100,0%
0 4 4
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 2 2
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 6 6
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
3 6 9
33,3% 66,7% 100,0%
11 18 29
37,9% 62,1% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
17 51 68
25,0% 75,0% 100,0%
Japan
 
revenue ratios
Total
country
not specified
Bulgaria
Canada
China
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Israel
Italy
UK
US
Ukraine
Total
Korea
Norway
Philippines
Russia
Slovak Republic
UK and US
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Table 213: Crosstabulation Country – Other Ratios 
non-existent existent
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
2 1 3
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
1 3 4
25,0% 75,0% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
4 2 6
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
5 4 9
55,6% 44,4% 100,0%
24 5 29
82,8% 17,2% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
45 23 68
66,2% 33,8% 100,0%
Japan
 
other ratios
Total
country
not specified
Bulgaria
Canada
China
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Israel
Italy
UK
US
Ukraine
Total
Korea
Norway
Philippines
Russia
Slovak Republic
UK and US
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Table 214: Crosstabulation Continent – Market Ratios 
non-existent existent
0 3 3
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
10 20 30
33,3% 66,7% 100,0%
3 9 12
25,0% 75,0% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
12 10 22
54,5% 45,5% 100,0%
26 42 68
38,2% 61,8% 100,0%
Total
 
market ratios
Total
continent
not specified
America
Asia
Eurasia
Europe
 
 
Table 215: Crosstabulation Continent – Revenue Ratios 
non-existent existent
0 3 3
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
11 19 30
36,7% 63,3% 100,0%
2 10 12
16,7% 83,3% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
4 18 22
18,2% 81,8% 100,0%
17 51 68
25,0% 75,0% 100,0%
Total
 
revenue ratios
Total
continent
not specified
America
Asia
Eurasia
Europe
 
 
Table 216: Crosstabulation Continent – Other Ratios 
non-existent existent
3 0 3
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
25 5 30
83,3% 16,7% 100,0%
8 4 12
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
0 1 1
0,0% 100,0% 100,0%
9 13 22
40,9% 59,1% 100,0%
45 23 68
66,2% 33,8% 100,0%
Total
 
other ratios
Total
continent
not specified
America
Asia
Eurasia
Europe
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Table 217: Crosstabulation 1940s – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
31 23 13 67
46,3% 34,3% 19,4% 100,0%
1 0 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
 
type of incentive
Total
1940s
non-existent
existent
 
 
Table 218: Crosstabulation 1950s – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
30 23 13 66
45,5% 34,8% 19,7% 100,0%
2 0 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
 
type of incentive
Total
1950s
non-existent
existent
 
 
Table 219: Crosstabulation 1970s – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
25 17 12 54
46,3% 31,5% 22,2% 100,0%
7 6 1 14
50,0% 42,9% 7,1% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
 
type of incentive
Total
1970s
non-existent
existent
 
 
Table 220: Crosstabulation 1980s – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
16 9 7 32
50,0% 28,1% 21,9% 100,0%
16 14 6 36
44,4% 38,9% 16,7% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
 
type of incentive
Total
1980s
non-existent
existent
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Table 221: Crosstabulation 1990s – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
11 5 5 21
52,4% 23,8% 23,8% 100,0%
21 18 8 47
44,7% 38,3% 17,0% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
 
type of incentive
Total
1990s
non-existent
existent
 
 
Table 222: Crosstabulation 2000s – Type of Incentive 
positive negative both
26 20 10 56
46,4% 35,7% 17,9% 100,0%
6 3 3 12
50,0% 25,0% 25,0% 100,0%
32 23 13 68
47,1% 33,8% 19,1% 100,0%
Total
 
type of incentive
Total
2000s
non-existent
existent
 
 
Table 223: 1940s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,142 ,243
Cramer's V ,142 ,243
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 224: 1940s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
1940s Dependent ,142
#EPR Dependent ,122
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 225: 1940s – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,096 ,428
Cramer's V ,096 ,428
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Table 226: 1940s – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
1940s Dependent ,171
#MR Dependent ,000
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 227: 1940s – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,071 ,561
Cramer's V ,071 ,561
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 228: 1940s – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
1940s Dependent ,313
#RR Dependent ,070
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 229: 1940s – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,087 ,471
Cramer's V ,087 ,471
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 230: 1940s – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
1940s Dependent ,087
#OR Dependent ,085
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 231: 1950s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,026 ,831
Cramer's V ,026 ,831
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Table 232: 1950s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
1950s Dependent ,085
#EPR Dependent ,062
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 233: 1950s – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,137 ,259
Cramer's V ,137 ,259
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 234: 1950s – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
1950s Dependent ,243
#MR Dependent ,000
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 235: 1950s – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,101 ,407
Cramer's V ,101 ,407
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 236: 1950s – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
1950s Dependent ,224
#RR Dependent ,043
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 237: 1950s – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,124 ,305
Cramer's V ,124 ,305
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Table 238: 1950s – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
1950s Dependent ,124
#OR Dependent ,121
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 239: 1960s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,089 ,462
Cramer's V ,089 ,462
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 240: 1960s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
1960s Dependent ,196
#EPR Dependent ,009
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 241: 1960s – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,068 ,574
Cramer's V ,068 ,574
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 242: 1960s – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
1960s Dependent ,114
#MR Dependent ,000
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 243: 1960s – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,000 1,000
Cramer's V ,000 1,000
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Table 244: 1960s – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
1960s Dependent ,289
#RR Dependent ,144
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 245: 1960s – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,179 ,141
Cramer's V ,179 ,141
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 246: 1960s – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
1960s Dependent ,179
#OR Dependent ,174
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 247: 1970s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,002 ,986
Cramer's V ,002 ,986
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 248: 1970s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
1970s Dependent ,171
#EPR Dependent ,089
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 249: 1970s – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,026 ,828
Cramer's V ,026 ,828
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Table 250: 1970s – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
1970s Dependent ,154
#MR Dependent ,036
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 251: 1970s – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
1970s Dependent ,485
#RR Dependent ,124
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 252: 1980s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,158 ,193
Cramer's V ,158 ,193
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 253: 1980s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
1980s Dependent ,203
#EPR Dependent ,190
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 254: 1980s – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
1980s Dependent ,478
#MR Dependent ,203
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 255: 1980s – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,068 ,575
Cramer's V ,068 ,575
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Table 256: 1980s – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
1980s Dependent ,355
#RR Dependent ,035
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 257: 1980s – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,136 ,264
Cramer's V ,136 ,264
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 258: 1980s – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
1980s Dependent ,173
#OR Dependent ,157
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 259: 1990s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,003 ,981
Cramer's V ,003 ,981
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 260: 1990s – Number of Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value
1990s Dependent ,228
#EPR Dependent ,015
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 261: 1990s – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,133 ,273
Cramer's V ,133 ,273
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
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Table 262: 1990s – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
1990s Dependent ,254
#MR Dependent ,125
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 263: 1990s – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,018 ,880
Cramer's V ,018 ,880
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 264: 1990s – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
1990s Dependent ,352
#RR Dependent ,101
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 265: 2000s – Efficiency/Profitability Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,165 ,173
Cramer's V ,165 ,173
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 266: 2000s – Market Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi -,033 ,788
Cramer's V ,033 ,788
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 267: 2000s – Number of Market Ratios 
Value
2000s Dependent ,136
#MR Dependent ,076
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
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Table 268: 2000s – Revenue Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,089 ,463
Cramer's V ,089 ,463
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 269: 2000s – Number of Revenue Ratios 
Value
2000s Dependent ,310
#RR Dependent ,041
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 270: 2000s – Other Ratios 
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,077 ,527
Cramer's V ,077 ,527
68
 
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
 
 
Table 271: 2000s – Number of Other Ratios 
Value
2000s Dependent ,266
#OR Dependent ,134
 
Nominal by 
Interval
Eta
 
 
Table 272: Crosstabulation 1940s – Effect 
positive effect no effect
59 8 67
88,1% 11,9% 100,0%
1 0 1
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
 
effect
Total
1940s
non-existent
existent
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Table 273: Crosstabulation 1950s – Effect 
positive effect no effect
58 8 66
87,9% 12,1% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
 
effect
Total
1950s
non-existent
existent
 
 
Table 274: Crosstabulation 1960s – Effect 
positive effect no effect
56 8 64
87,5% 12,5% 100,0%
4 0 4
100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
 
effect
Total
1960s
non-existent
existent
 
 
Table 275: Crosstabulation 1970s – Effect 
positive effect no effect
47 7 54
87,0% 13,0% 100,0%
13 1 14
92,9% 7,1% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
 
effect
Total
1970s
non-existent
existent
 
 
Table 276: Crosstabulation 1980s – Effect 
positive effect no effect
27 5 32
84,4% 15,6% 100,0%
33 3 36
91,7% 8,3% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
 
effect
Total
1980s
non-existent
existent
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Table 277: Crosstabulation 1990s – Effect 
positive effect no effect
20 1 21
95,2% 4,8% 100,0%
40 7 47
85,1% 14,9% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
 
effect
Total
1990s
non-existent
existent
 
 
Table 278: Crosstabulation 2000s – Effect 
positive effect no effect
52 4 56
92,9% 7,1% 100,0%
8 4 12
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
60 8 68
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Total
 
effect
Total
2000s
non-existent
existent
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ABSTRACT 
Executive compensation is often rumored to be unrelated to firm performance or to 
be connected with short-term rather than long-term profitability. Business companies 
face the challenge of implementing effective incentives for their executives that have 
a positive impact on firm performance. 
Inferior firm performance can be based on incompetence of managers, insufficient 
incentives for managers, or both. Antidotes include replacing incumbents with more 
skilled managers, establishing the right incentives or a combination of the two. These 
amendments are often considered as complementary. 
 
By means of a meta-analysis of sixty studies, the thesis investigated the efficiency of 
the two major incentive systems positive vs. negative incentives, i.e. bonus vs. 
dismissal. Its major aim was to identify the more useful framework from an economic 
point of view and bring to light which one leads to better firm performance. 
Interestingly, disincentives always have a positive effect on firm performance 
according to the analysis. Relatively, positive incentives are the type that most 
frequently has no effect on firm performance. There is a strong correlation between 
the incentive type and its effect on firm performance. 
The estimates of the logistic regression confirm that positive incentives reduce the 
odds of a positive effect on firm performance. They increase the odds of no effect. 
Conversely, negative incentives increase the odds of a positive effect whereas they 
decrease the odds of no effect. 
According to the present analysis, dismissal seems to be the more useful framework 
of incentives from an economic point of view in order to achieve a positive effect on 
firm performance. 
 
Additionally, the thesis intended to identify the relevant factors affecting the 
implementation of a particular incentive scheme. The correlation analysis finds 
associations and differences across industries, countries, continents, regions, and 
time periods regarding the incentive type, its effect on firm performance, and how 
company performance is measured. 
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According to the correlation analysis, the country and the industry of a study show 
the strongest correlations with the type of incentive and performance measures used, 
as well as the effect on firm performance detected. 
On the other hand, there are no or merely weak correlations between the continent 
as well as the time period the paper was composed in and the incentive type and 
performance measures employed or the effect measured. 
Predictably, the factors that increase the odds of negative incentives being employed 
reduce the odds of positive incentives being used and vice versa. 
The commercial, financial and public industries reduce the odds of negative 
incentives while they increase the odds of positive incentives being employed. The 
sports and utility industries increase the odds of negative incentives whereas they 
decrease the odds of positive incentives being used. 
The odds of negative incentives are reduced and the odds of positive incentives are 
increased if a study is American or Asian. An Eastern or Western European paper 
increases the odds of negative incentives being employed while it decreases the 
odds of positive incentives. 
Post-1990s studies result in reduced odds of negative incentives being investigated 
whereas they cause increased odds of positive incentives. 
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ABSTRACT 
Managerboni wird oft nachgesagt, nichts mit der durch den Manager erbrachten 
Leistung gemeinsam zu haben. Es ist eine große Herausforderung für Unternehmen 
Anreizsysteme, die das Unternehmensergebnis verbessern, zu implementieren. 
 
Da zu diesem Thema bereits zahlreiche Literatur erschienen ist, wurde versucht, 
anhand einer Metaanalyse über sechzig Studien die Effizienz von positiven und 
negativen Anreizen, also Prämien und Kündigung, festzustellen. Die Absicht der 
Arbeit war es, das zweckdienlichere System zu ermitteln, also jenes, das zu einem 
besseren Unternehmensergebnis führt. 
 
Interessanterweise haben negative Anreize in den untersuchten Studien immer einen 
positiven Effekt auf das Unternehmensergebnis, wohingegen positive Anreize relativ 
gesehen am öftesten gar keinen Effekt haben. Es gibt eine starke Korrelation 
zwischen dem verwendeten Anreizschema und dem Effekt auf das Unternehmens-
ergebnis. 
Die Ergebnisse der logistischen Regression bestätigen, dass positive Anreize die 
Chancen auf einen positiven Effekt verringern; sie erhöhen hingegen die Chancen 
auf keinen Effekt auf das Unternehmensergebnis. Im Gegensatz dazu steigern 
negative Anreize die Wahrscheinlichkeit für einen positiven Effekt auf das 
Unternehmensergebnis, während sie die Wahrscheinlichkeit für keinen Effekt 
senken. 
Der vorliegenden Analyse zufolge ist also die Androhung von Kündigung rein 
wirtschaftlich betrachtet das nützlichere System, wenn ein positiver Effekt von 
Anreizen auf das Unternehmensergebnis erreicht werden soll. 
 
Zusätzlich beabsichtigte die Diplomarbeit festzustellen, welche Faktoren die 
Umsetzung eines bestimmten Anreizschemas begünstigen. Mit Hilfe einer 
Korrelationsanalyse wurden Zusammenhänge und Unterschiede zwischen Branchen, 
Ländern, Kontinenten, Regionen und Zeitabschnitten, in denen die Primärstudien 
erstellt wurden, in Hinsicht auf die verwendeten Anreizsysteme und Kennzahlen, 
anhand derer das Unternehmensergebnis gemessen wurde, als auch den 
gemessenen Effekt von Anreizen, ermittelt. 
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Der Korrelationsanalyse zufolge korrelieren das Land und die Branche einer Studie 
am stärksten mit dem Anreizsystem, den Unternehmenskennzahlen und dem 
gemessenen Effekt auf das Unternehmensergebnis. 
Andererseits gibt es keine oder nur schwache Korrelationen zwischen dem Kontinent 
und dem Zeitabschnitt einer Studie und dem Anreizsystem, den verwendeten 
Unternehmenskennzahlen und dem Effekt auf das Unternehmensergebnis. 
Wie vorherzusehen war, verringern Faktoren, die die Wahrscheinlichkeit erhöhen, 
dass negative Anreize implementiert werden, die Chancen auf positive Anreize und 
umgekehrt. 
Gewerbliche, finanzielle und öffentliche Branchen verringern die Wahrscheinlichkeit, 
dass negative Anreize verwendet werden, während sie die Chancen auf positive 
Anreize steigern. Im Gegensatz dazu erhöhen die Branchen Sport und Energie-
versorgungsunternehmen die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass negative Anreize angewandt 
werden, wohingegen sie die Chancen auf positive Anreize verkleinern. 
Handelt es sich um eine amerikanische oder asiatische Studie, werden die Chancen 
auf positive Anreize erhöht und die Chancen auf negative Anreize verringert. Ost- 
oder westeuropäische Studien hingegen erhöhen die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass 
negative Anreize implementiert werden, während sie die Wahrscheinlichkeit für 
positive Anreize verkleinern. 
Studien, die nach dem Jahr 1990 verfasst wurden, unterliegen eher der 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass positive Anreize untersucht werden und haben eine 
geringere Chance auf negative Anreize. 
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